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ABSTRACT
KENNETH D. REDDIX II: Powering Demand: Solar Photovoltaic Subsidies in California.
(Under the direction of Brian McManus)
Households’ decisions to purchase solar photovoltaic systems are characterized by large up-
front costs, differentiated products, and uncertainties about future government subsidies. This
study analyzes the interplay of these factors using a dynamic discrete choice model. I use a newly
assembled dataset, that covers all installations from 2002 through 2006 in California at the house-
hold level, to estimate demand for solar panel installations. I find that across the distribution of
housing values, households are price elastic with respect to both temporary and permanent changes
in price. Also, I find that elasticities vary across the distribution of housing values. The marginal
effect of technological innovation is significant and positive with respect to the probability of pur-
chase. I find that a 1% increase in the efficiency rate increases the probability of purchase by 6.4%.
This is result is compounded by the fact that efficiency rates increase 30% over the sample period.
Through counterfactual simulations, I show that in the absence of government subsidies 49.5% of
all purchases would not have occurred. Additionally, over 70% of the total reduction in market
capacity when subsidies are removed is directly attributable to larger capacity installations. Lastly,
I find no evidence that household behavior is affected by the uncertainty associated with future
subsidy regimes.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the market for solar panel systems reached a value of $12 billion dollars with an
average annual growth rate of 50%. High growth rates in the solar market are attributed to the
widespread use of subsidies and tax credits by federal and state governments, and sharp reduc-
tions in the cost of solar panels. The U.S. Energy Information Administration reports that federal
funding for solar power increased 530%, from $179 million to $1.13 billion dollars, between the
years of 2007 to 2010.1 Since 2001, California has provided over $2 billion dollars in demand-
side subsidies for solar panel systems, and consequently leads the United States in residential solar
electricity generation.
For a household participating in a durable good market, the decisions of when to purchase
and what to purchase are both important. Particularly in markets that are characterized by rapid
technological innovation and declining market prices, a household might delay the decision to
purchase for the option value of waiting. The California residential market for solar panel systems
is similarly characterized by steady technological innovation and falling market prices, but is also
subjected to multiple short-lived subsidy regimes. Short-lived subsidy regimes, lasting 2 to 3
years, are used to temporarily reduce prices and stimulate households’ demand for solar panel
systems. For these reasons, it is important to model the demand for solar panel systems in a
dynamic framework. I introduce a structural model of dynamic demand for solar panel systems
that includes uncertainty about future prices and future subsidies, and I estimate the model using a
newly assembled data set at the household level. The model is used to investigate the implications
of multiple short-lived subsidy regimes, evaluate price elasticities, and measure the effectiveness
1http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf
of demand-side subsidies.
In a dynamic setting, households make decisions considering both the expectation regarding
the change in prices over time and the level of prices within a period. In the solar panel market,
forming expectations about the change in prices requires households to consider the change in
market prices for solar panel systems and the existence of future subsidy regimes. Market prices for
solar panel systems decline throughout the sample period with the price of an average solar panel
system falling more than 20%. To account for market price uncertainty, households are not fully
informed about the pricing process for solar panel systems, but instead expect future market prices
to follow a Markovian process. This assumption, while simple, allows for households to be correct
on average about the evolution of prices while still accounting for price uncertainty. Households are
fully informed about the schedule of subsidy rates within a particular regime, but lack information
about future regimes. To account for this uncertainty, households are assumed to have beliefs
regarding the existence of future regimes. Three separate deterministic belief structures are tested
in the paper. The estimation results show that demand is fairly robust to assumptions regarding
households beliefs about future subsidy regimes. The findings indicate that during the sample
period there does not seem to be an advantage of multiple regimes versus one long regime with
respect to the total number of purchases in the market.
I evaluate both the short-run and long-run price elasticities for households in the market for
solar panel systems. I consider the short-run case where all prices temporarily increase in one
period and return to previous levels. Households are fully informed about the change in prices and
results indicate that households are price elastic in the short run, due to the ability to substitute
purchases intertemporally. I also consider the long-run case where all prices receive a permanent
increase and do not return to previous levels. Results indicate that households are price elastic in
the long run but are less elastic relative to short run price elasticities. Estimates suggest that price
elasticities vary with respect to housing value.
To consider these factors, I use a California Energy Commission’s dataset that tracks all resi-
dential solar panel system purchases from 2002 through 2006. The data include an approval date,
total purchase price, total subsidy, capacity of the system installed, brand and model number of the
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system, and physical address of the household. I collect household-specific data on housing char-
acteristics, solar irradiation, and electricity prices for all households in California. Additional data
on household characteristics allow for the estimation of price responsiveness by housing value, and
the role of housing characteristics on the decision to purchase. To complement household data, I
collect detailed product characteristics for over 1,000 solar panel systems. Product-specific char-
acteristics allow for the inclusion of technological innovations and extension to a multi-product
choice set.
I estimate a household-level dynamic demand model for solar panel systems. In the model,
a household decides between purchasing one of the available systems in the market and postpon-
ing purchase. If the household decides to purchase a system, it receives the expected discounted
lifetime utility from the system and leaves the market indefinitely. If the household decides to
postpone purchase, it continues to participate in the market the following period and the choice
problem repeats. Before deciding, the household is fully informed of the prices, subsidies, product
characteristics, and tax credits for the current period. The household has limited information about
future prices of solar panel systems and holds beliefs about subsidy rates offered in the future.
Using this information, the household forms an expected value of continuing in the market consid-
ering uncertainty, beliefs, and making a purchasing decision. The model is estimated using a two
stage procedure similar to Rust (1994).
I contribute to the literature on solar panel adoption and policy in several ways. I improve upon
current research by introducing a model that accounts for household and product-level observed
heterogeneity and the uncertainty that consumers face regarding future prices and subsidies. The
results show that the impact of uncertainty regarding future subsidies is minimal in the case of the
solar market. Households are found to be price elastic with average short-run price elasticities of
-1.6, and average long-run price elasticities are found to be lower relative to short-run price elas-
ticities by 8%, suggesting that households are substituting demand intertemporally. The California
Emerging Renewable Energy program was effective at incentivizing over 54% of all purchases
during the two regimes.
This paper contributes to the growing literature exploring the impact of subsidies for solar
3
panel systems. Bollinger and Gillingham (2010) explore a clustering pattern in the data on solar
panel purchases and exploit exogenous variation in subsidies across utility regions to estimate peer
effects. They find evidence of peer effects and estimate the impact of a purchases on the duration
of time until the next purchase within a zip code. Hughes and Podlesky (2013) regress the number
of installations on fixed effects and rebate levels to analyze the effectiveness of subsidies on solar
installations and find that subsidies account for over 58% of purchases during their sample period.
Burr (2014) compares the effectiveness and efficiency of different types of subsidies in a structural
dynamic framework. She experiments with discount rates and finds interesting results with respect
to public versus private discount rates. Her results suggest that subsidies account for over 85% of
purchases in her dataset and finds the welfare neutral social cost of carbon to be $100 per metric
ton. I contribute to the literature by investigating the effects of multiple subsidy regimes on the
purchase of solar panel systems and discussing the impact of subsidies on both the total number of
market purchases and the total market capacity. I find 49.5% of purchases would not have occurred
in the absence of subsidies, and of the total loss in market capacity from the absence of subsidies,
70% is directly attributable to the reduction in the purchase of larger capacity systems.
In addition, this paper also contributes to the recent literature that uses structural models of
dynamic consumer behavior. There are two prominent lines of research in this literature. The
first line explores the purchasing decision for high tech products in markets where both prices
and technology are changing rapidly (Melnikov 2001, Carranza 2007, Nair 2007, Prince 2008,
Gowrisankaran and Rysman 2012). The research in this area focuses on either the introduction
of a new product into the market or the decision to replace an existing product. Gowrisankaran
and Rysman (2012) investigate the purchase and replacement decision for consumers in the digital
camcorder market, and include unobserved heterogeneity in both the marginal utility of quality
and the marginal utility for money. Accounting for this heterogeneity allows for the model to
capture the trade-off between quality and timing of replacement for consumers. I use a model
similar to Gowrisankaran and Rysman’s (2012) but without the decision to replace. I segment the
marginal utility of quality and money by household-level observable characteristics to allow for
heterogeneity in preferences for different segments of the solar market. Additionally, I explicitly
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model the impact of price uncertainty on the decision to purchase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the solar market, Chapter
3 discusses the model, and utility specifications, Chapter 4 discusses data, Chapter 5 details the
estimation procedure, Chapter 6 reports demand estimates and discusses fit, price elasticities and
marginal effects, Chapter 7 reports results from counterfactual simulations, and Chapter 8 con-
cludes.
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CHAPTER 2
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Solar Panels
Solar panel systems generate electricity from sunlight. The electricity production capability of
a solar panel system is a function of the system’s capacity rating and the hours of usable sunlight
at the installation site. Capacity ratings are a measure, in kilowatts (kW), of the maximum power a
system can produce under controlled test conditions1. Over the course of a day, a solar panel system
receives sunlight and generates electricity in units of kilowatt hours (kWh). Total generation of
electricity for the day is the product of the total hours of sunlight and the capacity rating of the
system.
How well a solar panel system converts sunlight into electricity is measured by the efficiency
rate of the system. Efficiency rates are a function of capacity rating, Photovoltaics for Utility
Systems Applications test conditions (PTC), and the physical size of a system expressed as:
Eff =
Capacity
Size ∗ PTC (2.1)
Equation 2.1 shows the inverse relationship between the efficiency rate and the physical size of
a solar panel system, when capacity is held constant. For two solar panel systems with identical
capacity ratings, if one system has a higher efficiency rate relative to the other, the system with the
higher efficiency rate will have a smaller physical footprint. Given equivalent hours of sunlight, the
1There are two test conditions used for solar panel systems in the state of California. The first, standard test
conditions (STC), reflect the solar panel’s production under ideal conditions. All panel characteristics are tested
including capacity rating, voltage, amps, and temperature. The state of California uses an additional measure known
as Photovoltaics for Utility Systems Applications test conditions (PTC) that test the panel in a controlled environment
that mimics real world conditions. These measures are performed by an independent third-party testing facility. The
subsidy program uses PTC capacity ratings to determine the amount of subsidy an installation site receives
two systems will produce the same amount of electricity, but the system with the higher efficiency
rate uses less physical area.
At the time of generation, electricity produced by the solar panel system is available for either
immediate consumption by the household or the electricity is sold on to the grid. To manage
the direction of the generated electricity, net meters are required to be installed for all solar panel
systems approved by the subsidy program. A net meter directs the flow of generated electricity and
tracks the quantity demanded and quantity supplied of electricity for the household.2 This enables
households that install a solar panel system to be both a consumer and producer of electricity.
A solar panel system is a durable good and by definition produces a multi-period stream of
benefits for the household. The duration of the benefits, generation of electricity for solar panel
systems, is conditional on the characteristics of the system purchased, weather at the installation
site, maintenance, and other factors at both the manufacturing and installation levels. Since the
solar panel systems in the sample period are in their infancy, the lifespan of the solar panel system
is approximated using warranty information provided by the manufacturer. The average solar panel
system comes with a warranty that covers the first 25 years of use, split between the first 10 years
and the subsequent 15. For the first 10 years, the warranty guarantees that the power output will
not go below 90% of the installed capacity rating. For the next 15 years, the warranty guarantees at
least 80% of the installed capacity rating. Assuming constant degradation, the average solar panel
system degrades at a rate of 0.9% per year, and continues to generate electricity well beyond the
warranty period. 3
2Generally speaking, a net meter prioritizes the flow of electricity from the solar panels for consumption first and
supplying to the grid as a secondary objective. During solar electricity production periods, the net meter will direct
solar generated electricity to the household until quantity demanded is satisfied or all solar generated electricity is
being consumed by the household. In the first case of quantity demanded being satisfied, the remaining solar generated
electricity will be sold onto the grid. In the second case of all solar generated electricity being consumed, the net meter
will buy from the grid to satisfy the household’s demand for electricity.
3The assumption of a constant degradation rate is for simplicity. There does not exist data on the rate in which
solar panel production will degrade over time.
7
2.2 Subsidies and Tax Credits
The California Emerging Renewables Energy program was established by the California En-
ergy Commission (CEC) in 1998 following Assembly Bill 1890 and Senate Bill 90 for distributing
funds collected to support renewable electricity generation technologies (Guidebook 2001). The
intent of the fund is to subsidize the purchase of renewable energy technologies through interven-
tion on the demand side of the market. To subsidize the residential market, the CEC introduced
capacity-based subsidies, an instrument that provides one-time monetary transfers based on the
capacity rating of the system installed.4 The subsidy a household receives is a function of the
capacity rating of the system and the subsidy rate available on the date of approval. The regimes
during the sample period differ concerning the subsidy rates offered, but all regimes use capacity-
based subsidies.
The CEC rebate program consists of three consecutive subsidy regimes lasting 2 to 3 years
each from 1998 until 2007. At the beginning of a subsidy regime, the CEC published a public
guidebook that provides households with information about the rebate program. The guidebook
includes information about the degree and timing of subsidy rates, eligibility requirements, and
eligible costs by a particular regime. The guidebook does not provide information about a future
subsidy regime, and this lack of information introduces uncertainty into the household’s choice
problem.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the three subsidy regimes that occur during the sample period. The vertical
axis represents the subsidy rate in dollars per watt installed. The horizontal axis is the years
covered during the sample period and are represented in 6-month intervals. The vertical dashed
lines represent a change in the subsidy regime. The first vertical dashed line on January of 2003
represents the beginning of the first 6-month period of the second subsidy regime. The second
dashed line at July of 2005 represents an unscheduled change in the subsidy rate during the second
subsidy regime. The third dashed line at January of 2007 represents the beginning of the first
6-month period of the third subsidy regime. The step function represents the subsidy rate for a
4The CEC uses a production based subsidy for commercial grade installations.
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Figure 2.1: Subsidy Rates over Time
6-month period. The solid circles identify the beginning period of the rate and hollow circles
identify the expiration of the rate. For example in Figure 2.1 the second step begins on January 1,
2003, with a solid circle, at a rate of $4.00 per watt and the rate ends on June 30, 2003 shown by
the hollow circle. The next subsidy rate of $3.80 per watt begins on July 1, 2003 and expires on
December 31, 2003. The black circles identify subsidy rates that actually occurred during the time
period specified and the gray dots identify subsidy rates that were scheduled but never realized.
The first subsidy regime begins in 2001 with a fixed subsidy rate of $4.50 per watt. This rate
remains unchanged until the end of 2002 when the regime expires. During the regime, subsidies
reduce the price of an average solar panel system by 46%, decreasing the price by $19,000. The
second subsidy regime begins in 2003 and continues through the end of 2006. The regime begins
with an initial rate of $4.00 per watt, and decreases $0.20 semi-annually with an additional $0.40
decrease in January of 2004.5 In spring 2005, the CEC released a revision to the 2003 public
5In Figure 2.1 and 2.2, subsidy rates after 2005 in gray illustrate the proposed schedule from the 2003 public
guidebook.
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guidebook that suspended the scheduled subsidy decrease and held the January 2005 subsidy rate
of $2.80 fixed for an additional year. In July of 2006, the subsidy rate incurred the scheduled
$0.20 decrease before the regime ended in December. The suspension of the scheduled decrease
generated a $0.40 per watt difference in the subsidy rate relative to the original schedule. This
difference reduced the price of an average solar panel system by an additional 5% or $1,500. After
the second subsidy regime, the distribution of funds specific to solar panel installations was handed
over to the new California Solar Initiative (CSI).
The California Solar Initiative is the third subsidy regime in the sample. The CSI begins in
2007 with a $2.01 subsidy rate6 and is scheduled to actively provide subsidies until 2016. The
CSI program introduced a new system for the timing of subsidy rate changes and the conditions
under which they transition. Subsidy rates are set at the state level following a rate schedule, but
the transition between rates occurs at the utility region level. In 2007, all utility regions start at
the same rate in the subsidy schedule.7 The transition between subsidy rates is a function of the
total amount of solar electricity generated in the utility region and a region-specific level of total
generation to trigger the transition.
In Figure 2.2 the subsidy rate step function is overlaid by the number of installations in the
sample period. The right-most vertical axis represents the number of installations and the height
of the vertical gray bars correspond to the number of installations in each 6-month period.
I hesitate to make causal claims about purchasing patterns by focusing solely on the subsidy
rates, and instead I discuss interesting patterns that emerge from the data. In general, the subsidies
seem to be generating a response from households in the population. For the first half of the second
regime, quantity demand is decreasing as subsidy rates fall. As a naive observation, quantity
demanded is expected to fall as subsidies decrease and prices remain the same. During this period,
the market price of a solar panel system is decreasing but at a rate slower relative to the decrease
in subsidies. This results in the net price per watt for a solar panel system increasing from 2002
6Inflation-adjusted subsidy rate.
7The CSI rate scheduled is provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 2.2: Subsidy Rate and Number of Installations Per Period
through 2005. Additionally, households know the schedule of subsidy rates within the regime and
given their expectation about future prices the expected change in the net price per watt of a solar
panel system is positive and increasing. Both the increase in the level of the net price per watt
and the expected positive change in net prices between periods lowers the probability of purchase
for households in the market. It is not surprising to see quantity demanded decreasing during this
period.
A second feature of Figure 2.2 is the increase, for the remainder of the regime, in quantity
demanded following an unscheduled change in the subsidy rate in 2005. At the onset of the delay,
quantity demanded almost doubles.8 The delay in the scheduled decrease of the subsidy impacts
per period net prices as well as households expectations about the change in net prices. Also, the
increase in quantity demanded occurs three periods from the end of the second subsidy regime. In
the data, there is evidence of a positive correlation between the number of periods left in a regime
8In Figure 2.2, quantity demanded doubles after the second vertical dashed line. During the first 6-month period
of 2005, 900 installations occur and in second half of 2005 installations go beyond 1800.
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Figure 2.3: Average Tax Credit Per Watt
and quantity demanded, likely due to the uncertainty regarding future subsidies. Both features of
the market would contribute to the increase in quantity demanded during this time period.
Tax credits are offered during the sample period in addition to the CEC subsidy program. Tax
credits are intended as a secondary source of subsidy. The amount of credit a household receives
is calculated from the net price of a system after accounting for the CEC subsidy. There are three
tax credit regimes that overlap with the sample period. The regimes differ by rate schedule and the
maximum allowable credit.
From 2001 through 2003, California offered a tax credit equal to the minimum of 15% of the
net price up to a maximum amount of $4.50 per watt. In all instances, households received a tax
credit equal to 15% of the net price paid. In 2004 and 2005, the state offered a similar tax credit,
but reduced the percentage to 7.5% of the net price and kept the maximum at $4.50 per watt. A
similar result occurred; all purchases qualified for the tax credit of 7.5% of net price paid with no
households receiving the maximum per watt amount offered. At the beginning of 2006, the state
did not renew the solar tax credit, but the federal government offered a nationwide tax credit. The
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federal tax credit increased the rate to 20% of the net price but capped the maximum total tax credit
at $2000. In all instances, households were provided with $2000 in federal tax credits.
Due to the structure of the tax credits, the credit per watt varies across capacities and Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (MSA). The variation across capacity occurs as a result of net price varying
across capacity. Similarly, variation in net prices across MSAs generate variation in the credit
per watt received by a household. In Figure 2.3, I show the average tax credit received for each
6-month period during the sample. The vertical axis represents the tax credit per watt and the hor-
izontal axis is the sample period discretized into 6-month bins. The step function represents the
average tax credit for each period.
During the first regime, average credits range from $0.91 per watt to $0.81 per watt. The
decrease in the credit per watt over the period reflects the decrease in the net price of a system
occurring at the same time. In the second regime, the tax credit is reduced by 50% with the credit
per watt starting at $0.43 per watt and increasing to $0.47 per watt. In the third regime, the credit
per watt increases to $0.67 per watt. The standard deviation of the average tax credit per watt varies
over the sample period. The largest variation occurs during the third regime because all households
receive a fixed tax credit regardless of the capacity of the solar panel system installed. This results
in larger capacity systems receiving a lower per watt tax credit.
In Figure 2.4, I show the evolution of prices for a medium size (2.72kW) solar panel installation
in the San Francisco area during the sample period. The vertical axis represents the price per watt
for a solar panel system, and the horizontal axis represents time in 6-month periods starting in
2002 and ending in 2007. Each time period has three prices represented on the graph. The black
dot represents the market price for the solar panel system during the 6-month time period. The
dark gray dot represents the net price of the system after accounting for the subsidy. The red dot
represents the net price of the system after accounting for the subsidy and tax credit.
There are two important trends to focus on in Figure 2.4. First, the CEC subsidies are the main
component in the reduction of solar panel system prices compared to tax credits. During the first
6-month period of 2002 the government reduced the price of a solar panel system by over 55%. Of
the total reduction, CEC subsidies account for 78.2% of the total price reduction for medium sized
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installations while the tax credit accounts for 21.8% of the price reduction. Throughout the sample
period the overall percentage reduction in the price decreases, but the subsidy continues to be the
largest contributor to the overall reduction in price. This does not discount the importance of the
tax credit but it provides support for the investigation into the effects of the subsidy program on
the household’s decision to purchase a solar panel system. Second, it is important to note that the
net price of purchasing a solar panel system is increasing after 2004. This is a direct result of the
subsidies and tax credits decreasing at a higher rate relative to the reduction in the market price for
a solar panel system. A similar trend occurs for solar panel installations across capacity level and
MSA.
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Figure 2.4: Medium Capacity Solar Panel System Prices in San Francisco
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CHAPTER 3
MODEL
3.1 Households’ Problem
At the beginning of the sample, no households in the market own a solar panel system. During
each period, households face the decision to purchase a solar panel system or postpone purchase.
Households that postpone purchase continue to be active in the market during the following pe-
riod. Households that purchase are removed from the market permanently and receive a stream of
benefits for the lifetime of the system. Households are constrained to purchase at most one system
per period and at most one system during their lifetime. Households do not have access to a resale
market, and are unable to upgrade the system after installation.1
The market is populated by a set of households i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}making purchasing decisions
in an infinite-horizon discrete-time framework. A household evaluates the alternatives, sit, from
the set of capacities available in the market. The full choice set of products and capacities is large
and as a simplification the choice set is aggregated to five options. The choice set includes the
outside option of not purchasing and four solar panel systems differentiated by capacity rating and
1The decision to constrain households to one purchase per lifetime is backed by the combination of empirical
evidence, high prices, and the durability of solar panels.
represented by the set S, where
S =

0 Outside Option
1 Small
2 Medium
3 Large
4 Extra Large
In the choice set, zero represents the outside option of not purchasing and options one through
four represent small (1.80kW), medium (2.72kW), large (4.14kW), and extra large (6.51kW)
capacities. Capacities are time invariant, I discretize the distribution of capacities over the sample
period into quartiles with support of zero to 10kW, the maximum allowable system capacity. I set
the mean of each quartile to represent the capacity rating for each option in the choice set.
At the beginning of each period, households have full information about the current period’s
state space Ωt = {P et , P spt , Zt, S, t, τt}. The state space includes the vector of electricity prices,
P et ; the vector of solar panel system prices, P
sp
t ; the vector of product characteristics, Zt; the
set of capacities, S; the vector of taste shocks, t; and the vector of tax subsidies and credits, τt.
Households are assumed to know the distribution of the state variables G (Ωt+1|Ωt). Households
select an alternative each period from the choice set to maximize their expected lifetime utility.
Initially, the market contains all households and is defined as M1 = N . At the end of each
period, the market is adjusted to account for households that purchase. The next period’s market
size is equal to, Mt+1 = Mt −
∑
i∈Mt 1 (sit 6= 0), the market size at the beginning of the period
minus the number of households that purchase in the same period. Including the endogenous
change in the size of the market eliminates the potential bias discussed below.
As households purchase and leave the market, the demand for solar panel systems shifts to
reflect the change in the distribution of households participating in the market. It is important to
adjust the market for changes in the distribution of household types and the number of market
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participants to reduce potential bias on the price coefficients. The bias enters by leaving a growing
set of households in the market that are perfectly price inelastic and due to their non-responsiveness
to price changes put downward pressure on the parameter estimates for price. To remove the bias,
I track the number of households that purchase and leave the market and adjust the market size
after each period.
3.2 Utility From Purchase
Let ωt = {P et , P spt , Zt, S, τt} represent the state variables without the household-level taste
shocks, t. The indirect lifetime utility from purchasing a solar panel system of size s at time t is:
Uist (ωt, t; θ, α) = θ1 + θ2ln [PVist (p
e
it; δ)] + θ3izt − αiln ((pspist − τst) qs) + θ4MSAi + ist (3.1)
The indirect utility function is comprised of the present value from purchase, non-price product
characteristics, the net price after receiving subsidies and tax credits, a MSA level fixed effect at
the time of purchase, and a purchase shock that is assumed to be distributed iid Type I extreme
value. The details of each part of the utility function are discussed below.
The second term in the utility specification, PVist, represents the present value of electricity
generated over the lifetime of the solar panel system for household i purchasing product s during
period t. I define the present value as:
PVist (p
e
it; δ) =
∞∑
k=t
[
βk−t (1− δsp)k−t (1 + δe)k−t peitqshsuni
]
(3.2)
where the bracketed term is summed over the lifetime of the system, and includes the following
components:
• peit the price of electricity for household i
• qs the capacity of solar panel system s
• hsuni the hours of sunlight for household i
• δe escalation rate for electricity prices
• δsp capacity rating degradation rate
• β discount rate
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On the right hand side of Equation 3.2, the term peitqsh
sun
i is the flow of revenue received each
period for the generation of solar electricity. The revenue term consists of the product of the price
of electricity for household i at time t, peit, and the total amount of solar generated electricity during
period t. The amount of solar generated electricity is calculated as the product of the capacity of
system s, qs, and the average hours of sunlight household i receives, hsuni , over a 6-month period.
The present value is calculated by adjusting the revenue stream each period to account for the
decrease in electricity generation due to the degradation of the system, changes in future electricity
prices, and discounting future income.
I calculate a constant degradation rate for solar panel systems during the sample based on data
from manufacturer-provided warranties. I assume the calculated rate to be a constant percentage
decrease in the production capabilities of the system and is consistent with the guaranteed produc-
tion listed in the warranty. In the present value equation, the degradation rate is represented as
δsp ∈ (0, 1) and reduces solar electricity generation by δsp% each period. Including the degrada-
tion rate helps improve the approximation of the present value of owning a solar panel system by
accounting for the eventual reduction in the generation of electricity. The reduction in capacity
decreases the quantity of electricity produced and leads to a reduction in revenue. Similarly, the
evolution of electricity prices must be accounted for in the revenue equation.
The price of electricity is a key variable for calculating the present value of purchasing a solar
panel system. In the dynamic framework it is reasonable to believe that households form expec-
tations about future electricity prices when making their purchasing decision. A simple way to
account for future changes in the price of electricity is to assume a constant escalation rate for
electricity prices. A more complex way is to model the process as Markovian and have consumers
form expectations over future prices. The latter option of implementing the price of electricity as
a stochastic state variable can be added to the present value computation albeit with a high com-
putational cost. To reduce the computational complexity, I assume a constant escalation rate to
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calculate the present value of purchasing a solar panel system, and use an inflation-adjusted aver-
age escalation rate calculated by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).2 Lastly, all
households in the sample are assumed to discount future income by a rate of β.
In Equation 3.1, the third term, θ3izt, captures the effect of non-price product characteristics
on the households decision problem, specifically the efficiency rate of a solar panel system. The
parameter enters the utility specification linearly and expands to include rooftop space as a di-
mension of observable consumer-level heterogeneity. I discretize the distribution of rooftop space
in the sample into three bins that represent small, medium, and large rooftop space households.3
I normalize the parameters relative to large rooftop space households. I interact the non-price
product characteristic covariate with the additional parameters designating both small and medium
rooftop space households.
θ3i = θ31 + θ321
(
xroofi = small
)
+ θ331
(
xroofi = medium
)
(3.3)
The first term in the Equation 3.3 captures the mean preference for efficiency rates in the sample
population of large rooftop space households. The second and third term capture the additional
utility received by households with either small or medium roof space. The decision to interact
efficiency rates and roof space is best understood when considering the importance of physical
area at an installation site.
Consider a household with roof space of 50 square meters. Given rooftop space and efficiency
rates at the beginning of the sample, the household is constrained physically to installing a solar
panel system no larger than 5kW. By the end of the sample period, the average efficiency rate
increases by 30%, and the largest capacity rating for the same installation site increases to 6.5kW.
The innovation in the efficiency rate over the sample period increases the semi-annual flow benefit
from purchase by $200 leading to a total increase of $4000 in the present value of purchase. The
2In Figure 4.1 the electricity rates are shown for each major utility company over the sample period. Additionally,
a trend line is added that represents the escalation rate for electricity prices.
3The measure for rooftop space is an approximation using the square footage of the home and the number of stories
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improvement in the present value of purchase from the larger capacity system may incentivize the
household to delay purchase until efficiency rates are sufficiently high.
In Equation 3.1, the fourth term is the natural log of the net price of a solar panel system. The
total net price per watt is comprised of the market price per watt, pSPist , subtracted by the approved
subsidy per watt and tax credit per watt, τst for household i and capacity size s at time t. The total
net price of a solar panel system is calculated as the product of the total net price per watt and the
capacity, qs, for choice s.4 The coefficient αi on the net price captures the disutility from the net
price of a solar panel system.
As a starting point, I discretize the distribution of housing values, at the state level, into terciles
and assign each household in the sample population to a housing value bin. The bins represent
low, medium, and high value homes, and serve as a proxy for wealth in the utility specification.
The price coefficient αi in Equation 3.4 includes additional parameters interacted with an indicator
function identifying a household’s housing value. By including αi, I introduce an observable
measure of household-level heterogeneity in the estimation of price responsiveness.
αi = α1 + α21(x
value
i = medium) + α31
(
xvaluei = high
)
(3.4)
I estimate the disutility from log prices in the sample population for households in the low housing
value category with the α1 coefficient. I estimate the differences in disutility that households of
medium and high value receive from the net price with the parameters α2 and α3.
The next term, θ4MSAi , is a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level fixed effect received at
the time of purchase. I include an MSA-level fixed effect in the model to reduce the presence
of endogeneity from omitted variables that are correlated with covariates in the model. Some
examples of this might be the average environmental preferences within a MSA, advertising or
marketing for solar panel subsidies, or pollution levels within a MSA.
In areas that are more ”green” or environmentally friendly households might receive additional
4It is important to note that while capacity is time invariant, the total net price per watt varies over time by the
market price, subsidy, and tax credit
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social utility from installing a solar panel system that is not accounted for in the current specifi-
cation. The unobserved social benefit from installing solar panels could be correlated with prices
making price endogenous in the model. The MSA fixed effect is included to capture variation from
a time invariant MSA level preference for green products and the social utility associated with it.
Another potential source of variation is advertising or marketing for either the solar panel subsidies
or solar panel installations in general. Lastly, MSA level characteristics that are correlated with
clean energy, level of pollution in the MSA, could generate endogeneity issues in the model. For
example, a household in L.A., where pollution is persistently high, might purchase a solar panel
system and receive unobserved utility from the belief that the system will help reduce pollution in
the local area and provide positive externalities to the community.
3.3 Utility From Waiting
In markets with durable goods, capturing the option value of waiting is important in explain-
ing the choice behaviors observed by households (Melnikov 2001, Gowrisankaran and Rysman
(2012)). The option value of waiting is the expected utility from participating in a future market.
The household choice-specific value function for choosing not to purchase is represented by Vi.
Vi (ωt, t; θ, α) = δ
f
i0t + i0t + β
ˆ
ωt+1
ˆ
t+1
Vi (ωt+1, t+1; θ, α)G (ωt+1, t+1|ωt, t) dωt+1dt+1
(3.5)
The contemporaneous indirect utility from not purchasing is characterized by a flow utility, δfi0t,
that is normalized to zero and an additive preference shock, i0t. The last term on the right hand
side of Equation 3.5 represents the option value of waiting, and is integrated over the conditional
joint distribution of the state variables, G (ωt+1, t+1|ωt, t). Intuitively, the term captures the mean
utility a household expects to receive by waiting to purchase considering future prices, technology,
subsidies, tax credits, and preference shocks.
Information about the evolution of the state variables is necessary for households to form an
expectation about their future value of staying in the market. Two state variables are assumed to
be stochastic: the price of solar panel systems and preference shocks. Households are assumed to
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know the distribution of their future preference shocks and are able to integrate over them. House-
holds are assumed to believe that the price per watt for solar panel systems follow a Markovian
process. Specifically, households expect that the price per watt for a solar panel system follows a
first order autoregressive specification,
P SPit+1 = δi1 + δi2P
SP
it + µit+1 (3.6)
where µit+1 is normally distributed iid shock with mean zero and variance σ2sp. The autoregressive
parameter δi2 satisfies the condition for stationarity 0 < δi2 < 1,∀i.
In Equation 3.6, I allow for the pricing process to differ across MSAs and allow local market
conditions to influence households expectations about future prices. A vast majority of installations
occur by local installers within the MSA and as such markets can be treated separately. Changes in
local market demand and supply conditions should generate differences across MSAs in the pricing
process to the extent that markets are independent. I compare the results of the per MSA estimation
of Equation 3.6 to a state-level pricing process, in which I assume that households believe that solar
panel system prices evolve similarly across capacity and MSA.
3.4 Tax Policies
Over the three subsidy regimes, information regarding policy changes becomes publicly avail-
able only at the time of the change. The uncertainty households have regarding future subsidy
regimes and changes to rate schedules creates uncertainty that enters into the dynamic choice
problem. Household beliefs regarding future regime changes can generate anticipatory behavior.
Anticipatory behavior has been shown to impact the effectiveness of a regime change (Mertens
and Ravn, 2010; Crepon et al, 2010, Blundell et al. 2014). To examine this, I specify deterministic
cases that vary by household beliefs regarding the existence and rate schedule of a future regime.
The deterministic cases are a simplistic way to capture anticipation effects that might arise from
beliefs about future regimes and control for them in estimation.
I investigate three cases of deterministic beliefs: perfect foresight, pessimism, and auto-renewal.
I use these cases as an initial investigation into anticipatory behavior in the solar market. To help
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Figure 3.1: Case 1: Perfect Foresight
describe the cases, let Pr(τ ′|τ) be defined as the probability that future regime τ ′ occurs condi-
tional on the household being in subsidy regime τ . Note that all households in the population are
assumed to share the same beliefs regarding future regimes.
In the first case, I assume that households have full information about all regimes, and can
predict the future perfectly. Perfect foresight implies that households have the following beliefs
Pr(τ ′|τ) =

1 if τ ′ = τtrue
0 Otherwise
(3.7)
where τtrue represents the true future subsidy regime. Figure 3.1 illustrates the information house-
holds have under perfect foresight during the sample period. The vertical axis represents the sub-
sidy rate per watt and the horizontal axis is the sample period discretized into 6-month bins. Note,
under perfect foresight households are not subject to the scheduled subsidy rates that were not
actualized represented in gray in Figure 2.1.
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In the second case, I assume that all households are pessimistic and believe that no additional
subsidies are offered after the expiration of the current regime. Pessimism implies that the discrete
probability density function takes the following form
Pr(τ ′|τ) =

1 if τ ′ = 0
0 Otherwise
(3.8)
where households believe with probability one that no future subsidy regimes will exist. In Figure
3.2a, I show a household’s belief regarding the existence of a future regime conditional on being in
the first regime of the sample period. When a new subsidy regime is reached the household updates
their information about the new policy but retains the same beliefs about the existence of a future
subsidy. In Figure 3.2b, I illustrate the transition to the second subsidy regime and how the belief
regarding a future regime does not change. The beliefs enter the households’ problem through the
expectation of future prices, and is expected to decrease the option value of waiting relative to the
perfect-foresight case.
In the third case, auto-renewal, households believe that the final subsidy rate in the present
regime will continue after the regime expires. Auto-renewal implies that the discrete probability
density function takes the following form
Pr(τ ′|τ) =

1 if τ ′ = τ f
0 Otherwise
(3.9)
where τ f represents the final rate in the current subsidy regime τ . In Figure 3.3a, I illustrate a
household’s belief about future subsidies conditional on being in the first subsidy regime. I show
in Figure 3.3b how the belief about a future regime does not change when a new regime is enacted
but the future subsidy rate is updated.5
5In Figure 3.3b I use two gray arrows to illustrate beliefs about a future subsidy regime. The top gray arrow repre-
sents household beliefs after the subsidy rate change is announced in July of 2005. The lower gray arrow represents
household beliefs before the rate change is announced.
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Figure 3.2: Case 2: Pessimistic Beliefs
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Figure 3.3: Case 3: Auto-Renewal Beliefs
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3.5 Identification
The identification strategy presented is fairly standard and follows the dynamic consumer de-
mand literature closely. Generally, changes in the market share of a product s associated with
a change in a product characteristic of good s helps identify the mean utility from a character-
istic. The identification of the parameter on price, present value of purchase, and technological
innovation are discussed below in detail.
The coefficients on the net price of a solar panel system are identified by variation in uptake that
are associated with variation in the net price. Specifically, identification of the vector of parameters
αi comes from variation in purchasing behavior within each tercile of the housing value distribution
that is associated with variation in the net price. Variation in the net price over time of solar panel
systems occur through three channels that are exogenous to the households choice problem. First,
the price of solar panels depends on a global market and price variation comes from exogenous
market forces: inputs for production (e.g. variation in the price of silicon), technological shocks
to the production process, and global demand for solar panels. Second, the price of installing a
solar panel system varies due to changes in installation costs for the installer such as: learning by
doing (e.g. returns to experience), technological innovation with respect to mounting equipment,
and economies of scale. Third, subsidy rates and tax credits vary over the sample period supplying
an additional layer of exogenous price variation.
Variation in purchase related to variation in the present value of purchase over time identifies
the parameter θ2. The present value of purchase varies over time through changes in the average
price of electricity. The price of electricity varies over time based on regulatory agencies’ decisions
at the utility level, regional demand for electricity, and input costs.
The vector of parameters θ3i on the non-price product characteristic, efficiency rate, is identified
by changes in purchasing patterns within each tercile of the distribution over roof space associated
with variation in efficiency rates. Efficiency rates exogenously vary over time through technologi-
cal innovations that occur on the supply side of the market (e.g. research and development of new
products).
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CHAPTER 4
DATA
I assemble a new dataset from a variety of sources to estimate the model in Chapter 3. I use
choice data from the California Energy Commission’s (CEC) Emerging Renewable Program that
covers eight years of residential solar panel installations in the state of California. I expand the
choice data by collecting detailed housing and solar panel characteristic data for each observation
in the CEC dataset. I pair these with relevant datasets that include measures of usable sunlight
hours and electricity prices during the sample period. To complete the panel, I simulate households
that are active in the solar panel market but do not purchase during the sample. The following
section discusses each of the above points in detail.
The CEC data track all households who purchase a solar panel system and receive a tax subsidy
from 1998 through 2006. These data include the address of the residence, capacity of the system
installed, total price paid, subsidy received, make and model of the installed solar panel system,
subsidy approval date, installation completion date, and the utility region in which the household is
located. I drop the first three years of data due to missing information and low numbers of purchase
during that time period. Additionally, I drop both commercial and utility-scaled installations and
keep purchases made by residential households. Lastly, I drop observations where the price per
watt is below $4.00 or greater than $30.00.1 This results in a dataset that consists of 12,736
observations of purchase for the sample period of 2002 through 2006.
I expand the data from the CEC by adding housing characteristics for each purchaser. I collect
the housing characteristics by matching the physical address of the purchaser with the real estate
website Zillow.com and scrape the relevant information. For each purchaser, I retrieve information
1A report by the CEC, Wiser, Bolinger, Cappers, and Margolis (2006), discusses how these are most likely input
errors and should not be used as valid prices.
on the value of the home, number of stories, square footage, number of bedrooms, and year built.2
As a redundancy check, I perform a similar task but with an alternative data source, Trulia.com,
and match housing characteristics with address information.
In Table 4.1, I present descriptive statistics specific to households that purchase during the
sample. The columns of the table are separated by geographic region. The first column shows de-
scriptive statistics for all purchasers at the statewide level. The second through the fifth column are
separated by MSA: 1) Los Angeles-Long Beach-Riverside, 2) San Francisco-San Jose-Oakland,
3) San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, and 4) Fresno-Madera-Sacramento.3 The San Francisco-San
Jose area has the highest average home values at $841,070 with the coastal MSAs, Los Angeles
and San Diego, following with an average home value of $560,000. The more in-land region,
Fresno and Sacramento, have the lowest average housing value at $373,066.
The San Francisco metropolitan statistical area makes up 47% of the total number of purchases
in the data with 5986 solar panel system installations. Purchasers in San Francisco have the small-
est average roof space at 183.49 m2 and install smaller than average capacity systems, 3.54kW,
relative to the rest of the state. Also, purchasers in San Francisco buy slightly earlier in the sample,
on average, and pay higher prices per watt for the systems. The descriptive statistics suggest that a
higher share of early adopters of solar panel systems live in the San Francisco area.
I simulate the population of households for each zip code in the CEC dataset. The simulated
households are generated using a dataset from Dataquick. The data include marginal distribution
information at the zip-code level that describes housing characteristics of potential market partic-
ipants.4 The data characterizes households within each zip code by five housing characteristics:
housing value, the number of stories, square footage, the number of bedrooms, and the year the
house was built. For each characteristic, the dataset includes the first two moments of the marginal
2Zillow.com uses an algorithm for housing value named Zestimate that considers recent sales of similar homes and
neighborhood characteristics when estimating the housing value.
3It is important to note that not all zip codes within the MSAs are represented in Table 4.1. I drop all zip codes
with less than 5 purchases during the sample period. The result is a total of 345 zip codes used in estimation.
4This includes single family homes, both detached and attached. Multi-family homes such as condominiums and
apartment buildings are excluded from the data.
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distribution, number of observations, correlations between the housing characteristics, and the
quartiles of the marginal distribution. The matrix of correlations between housing characteristics
provides useful information by improving the accuracy of the simulated populations.
I use a copula function to create a joint distribution of housing characteristics and simulate the
entire population of households in each zip code. The copula function is assumed to be multivariate
normally distributed (Gaussian Copula) with mean zero and a covariance-variance matrix Σ. The
matrix Σ is calculated using the correlation measures between characteristics and the variance of
each characteristic. Zip codes are independently simulated using a multivariate normal copula with
each zip code having a unique Σ matrix.
The copula function creates a joint distribution of household characteristics from a set of
marginal distributions. The Gaussian copula provides structure by enforcing the correlations that
exist between the housing characteristics when simulating households.5 The result is a simulated
population of households characterized by a vector of discrete housing characteristics from a nor-
mal distribution.
I merge the simulated dataset and the set of purchasers by matching housing characteristics.
For each zip code, I search the simulated dataset for a vector of housing characteristics that match
identically with the vector of housing characteristics for each purchaser. Once a match is found,
I replace the simulated household with the matched purchaser. The process is performed for all
purchasers and across all zip codes represented in the sample. This results in a dataset of 2,272,841
households in the market for residential solar panel installations that includes both households
that purchase and do not purchase during the sample period. With over 2 million households
participating in the market for solar panel systems and only 12,736 purchases during the sample,
the size of the choice probabilities are a potential concern in estimation. To improve the choice
probabilities, I reduce the market size for each MSA informed by a survey conducted in California
about attitudes toward renewable energy.
5The details of the simulation process are provided in the appendix.
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In 2001, an independent study was contracted by the California Energy Commission, con-
ducted by Marylander Marketing Research, with the stated purpose of determining awareness and
attitude toward renewable energy sources among households and businesses in California. In the
survey households were asked several questions regarding their history with renewable energy
sources, knowledge of renewable energy, and their desire to have a renewable energy source at
their residence.
The question of interest for reducing the market size asked households the following question:
What is the likelihood of installing a solar, wind, or fuel cell renewable energy system at your
home?
1. Definitely Would Install
2. Probably Would Install
3. Might or Might Not Install
4. Probably Would Not Install
5. Definitely Would Not Install
The survey finds that, conditional on not ever owning a renewable energy system, 15% of the
population answered either definitely or probably would install, 23% said they might or might not
install, and 62% answered that they either probably or definitely would not install. The large share
of households answering negatively suggest a reduction in the population of market participants is
appropriate during the sample period.
The survey includes an additional table that breaks down the household response to the question
above by MSA. The survey finds that 31% of households in San Jose, 10% of households in Los
Angeles, 26% of households in San Diego, and 10% of households in Fresno definitely or probably
would install a renewable energy home at their residence. I reduce the market size by resizing
the population in each zip code with respect to the MSA percentages above. First, I include all
purchasers in the reduced market data. Next, I randomly select a sample population of households
from each zip code to be market participants. The process results in a dataset that consists of
505,557 total households participating in the solar market for the sample period. Table 4.3 details
the distribution of household characteristics at the state level and by MSA of the reduced sample
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used in estimation.
Outside of housing characteristics, households face location-specific exogenous characteristics
in the form of electricity prices by utility region and the number of hours of sunlight at their
residence. The data on electricity prices originates from the websites of the three largest utility
companies in California: Pacific Gas and Electric (PGE), Southern California Edison (SCE), and
San Diego Gas and Electric (SDGE). These three utility companies supply electricity to over 85%
of all households in California and more importantly provide electricity to the zip codes in the
sample. Within all three utility companies, there is a menu of electricity rate plans that households
can choose from. The plans are based on either baseline quantity-tiered pricing or time-of-use
pricing. I am not able to take advantage of the detailed pricing data without information on the
type of plan a household chooses and their consumption of electricity. Instead, I use a dataset from
the California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) that calculates average prices for residential
electricity consumption for each utility region over time.6
In Figure 4.1 the electricity price per kilowatt hour is represented on the vertical axis and the
horizontal axis represents time, beginning in 2002 and ending in 2010. The electricity prices are
deflated to 2006 price levels with rate changes only occurring annually.7 Average electricity prices
are generally increasing over the time period. The relatively high prices in 2002 are a residual
effect from the deregulation of electricity markets that occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000.
San Diego Gas and Electric have the highest electricity prices throughout the time period shown.
Average electricity prices are similar between Pacific Gas and Electric and Southern California
Edison, but PGE prices tend to be slightly higher.
I gather data for the number of hours of sunlight a household receives from the National Re-
newable Energy Laboratory’s (NREL) Typical Meteorological Year (TMY3) dataset. The data are
collected by 74 weather stations located across California that record a variety of meteorological
measures. Using the data, I aggregate from a hourly measure of sunlight to a 6-month measure.
6The restrictions that arise from using average electricity rate data are discussed in the appendix.
7For clarity, the electricity prices are fixed for the year and do not transition as the figure suggests.
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Time
Cents Per kWh
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
13.0
13.5
14.0
14.5
15.0
15.5
16.0
16.5
17.0
17.5
Cents Per kWh PGE
Cents Per kWh SDGE
Cents Per kWh SCE
End of sample period
Figure 4.1: Electricity Prices by Utility Company
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I average the semi-annual hours of sunlight over the years during the sample to create a time in-
variant measure of the average number of hours of sunlight a location receives. The geographical
longitude and latitude of each station is differenced with the latitude and longitude of the center
of each zip code, and the station closest to the zip code is used to measure sunlight hours.8 An-
nual average sunlight hours are presented in Table 4.1 across the state and for each MSA. There is
substantial variation in annual sunlight across the MSA regions with an average of 1820.29 hours
of sunlight and a standard deviation of 93.83 hours. The least amount of sunlight occurs in the
San Francisco region where the average is 1757.18 hours of sunlight. The largest amount of sun-
light occurs in the Los Angeles region where the households receive an average of 1920.55 hours
of sunlight annually. On average households in California receive 5 hours of usable sunlight per
day. The difference between the hours of sunlight received in San Francisco and Los Angeles is
approximately 32 days of average sunlight.
Households choose over a set of solar panel systems that vary by capacity, price, and technol-
ogy. The data on solar panel system capacity and price are included in the CEC dataset and are
shown in Table 4.1 above. While the average total price of a solar panel system is similar across
MSAs there is variation in both the capacity of the system installed and the price per watt. In
Figure 4.2 the average price per watt of a solar panel system is shown by MSA over the sample
period. At the beginning of the sample prices are closely matching but after 2003 the gap between
the average prices increases. The largest gap shows up between San Francisco and San Diego
where at one point they differ by $1 per watt installed.
The aggregation of price per watt into an average for all installations is a bit misleading. Figure
4.3 displays the price per watt within the Los Angeles MSA by capacity bin and over the sample
period. The figure shows evidence of size discounting occurring in the solar market. I find that
extra-large capacity systems have significantly lower prices per watt relative to small capacity
solar panel systems. There is almost a $2.00 price per watt difference between the small capacity
installations and extra large capacity installations during 2005. Note that prices seem to trend
8The distance is taken using using the haversine formula. The haversine formula is an equation that finds the
distance between any two points on the surface of a sphere. Simply put, it measures the distance as the crow flies.
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Time
$/Watt
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
7.5
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
10.0
10.5
11.0
11.5
12.0
Price Per Watt MSA 1 (LA)
Price Per Watt MSA 2 (SF)
Price Per Watt MSA 3 (SD)
Price Per Watt MSA 4 (Fresno)
Subsidy Regime Change
Figure 4.2: Price Per Watt by MSA
similarly over time both across capacity bins and across MSAs. Also, there is a growing difference
in the price level of solar panels systems over time.
A solar panel system is a collection of solar panels joined together to generate an output of
electricity. The characteristics of a solar panel system depends directly on the characteristics of the
solar panels in the group. In the CEC dataset all households purchase a solar panel system that is
a collection of one unique solar panel. Solar panel system characteristics are created by collecting
non-price product characteristics for each brand and model combination of solar panels observed
in the CEC dataset.
I gather solar panel product characteristics from manufacturers’ specification sheets for each of
the unique solar panels. The specification sheets provide information about the STC/PTC capacity
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Time
$/Watt
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
7.50
8.00
8.50
9.00
9.50
10.00
10.50
11.00
11.50
12.00
Capacity Bin 1 (Small)
Capacity Bin 4 (X-Large)
Subsidy Regime Change
Figure 4.3: Price Per Watt by Capacity Bin in Los Angeles
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rating, efficiency rate, physical size, type of panel, warranty information, and additional technical
details for a specific solar panel.9 Two tables are included to show the distribution of characteristics
in the full sample of solar panels and the more restricted sample used in estimation. The full set of
unique solar panels is shown in Table 4.4 and the set of panels that result from constraints imposed
on the purchase data are represented in Table 4.5.
The two tables show the narrowing of the solar panel market after imposing restrictions on
geographic location, total capacity of the system, and measurement error in reporting of prices.
The market for residential solar panels is different relative to the entire market. First, average PTC
capacity rating per panel is 40kW less in the residential market relative to the entire market.10
Also, the maximum capacity rating of a solar panel in the residential market is 297kW where in
the broader market the maximum capacity rating of a solar panel is 779.8kW. The physical size of
an average solar panel in the residential market is smaller both in physical area, 1.22 m2 versus
1.49 m2 in the larger market, and weight, 15.44 kg versus 18.12 kg in the broader market. Lastly,
average efficiency rates in the residential market are less relative to the broader market with close
to a 9% difference in the efficiency rate. The findings suggests that the broader market for solar
panels is not the appropriate choice set for residential households. Instead, the characteristics of
solar panel systems used in estimation are constrained to the restricted sample.
I capture innovation in solar panel technology through the improvement in efficiency ratings
of solar panels over the sample period. In Figure 4.4 average efficiency rates are shown over time.
The vertical axis represents efficiency rates in percentage terms with an average efficiency rate
of 10.46% at the beginning of the sample period. Over the sample, efficiency rates are trending
upwards and increase a total of 29% from 2002 to 2007.
9A sample of a specification sheet is included in appendix.
10The first measure of capacity is the standard test condition (STC) ratings. STC ratings are provided by the
manufacturer and are the result of an in-lab test of the panel. The second measure of capacity is PVUSA test condition
(PTC) ratings. PTC ratings are more realistic and result from controlled testing in an outdoor setting. With respect to
the subsidies, PTC ratings are used to measure the overall capacity of a system when calculating the amount of subsidy
an installation receives.
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Time
Rate(%)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
10.0
10.5
11.0
11.5
12.0
12.5
13.0
13.5
14.0
14.5
Average Efficiency Rate (%)
Figure 4.4: Efficiency Rates over Time
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
STC Capacity Rating 1016 189.56 69.36 14 864
PTC Capacity Rating 1016 169.69 63.24 11.8 779.8
Efficiency Rates 1016 11.67 2.19 2.35 18.48
Panel Area (m2) 1016 1.49 1.09 .12 18.59
Panel Depth (mm) 972 43.89 13.18 2.5 213
Weight (Kg) 967 18.12 6.99 1.9 67
Table 4.4: Full Set of Solar Panels
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
STC Capacity Rating 271 147.61 53.21 17 330
PTC Capacity Rating 271 131.88 47.84 15.7 297
Efficiency Rates 271 10.82 2.4 2.35 16.48
Panel Area (m2) 271 1.22 .37 .35 2.43
Panel Depth (mm) 266 45.12 10.32 2.5 60
Weight (Kg) 265 15.44 6.98 2.2 48.5
Table 4.5: Set of Purchased Solar Panels
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CHAPTER 5
ESTIMATION
To estimate the model discussed in Chapter 3, I impose several assumptions to reduce computa-
tion time and provide tractability in estimation. Given the assumptions, estimation of the dynamic
discrete choice problem is accomplished using three-stage maximum likelihood estimation with a
combination of Rust’s (1987,1994) nested fixed point algorithm (NFXP) and backwards induction
to estimate the continuation value of staying in the market. The first stage of the estimation routine
recovers parameters that govern the transition of solar panel system prices. Using the estimated
parameters for solar panel system prices, the second stage of the estimation iterates over a nested
loop. The inner loop estimates the continuation value of staying in the market and the outer loop
estimates parameters through maximum likelihood estimation. The third stage corrects consistency
issues with the covariance matrix of second-stage parameter estimates by using the consistent esti-
mate of the parameter vector from the first two stages to maximize the full log-likelihood equation.
Altogether the three stage algorithm is able to estimate the dynamic discrete choice problem and
generate consistent parameter estimates. The details of the assumptions, algorithm, and calculation
of standard errors are discussed in what follows.
The Bellman equation representing the household’s per period maximization problem is framed
as a decision between purchasing one of four available products in the market or choosing to forgo
purchase and take the continuation value of staying in the market for an additional period. From
chapter 3, the household’s maximization problem is modeled as:
Vit (ωt, t; θ) = max{i0t + β
ˆ
ωt+1
ˆ
t+1
Vit+1 (ωt+1, t+1; θ)G (ωt+1, t+1|ωt, t) dωt+1dt+1,
maxs∈{1,2,3,4}Uist (ωt, t; θ)} (5.1)
The first term on the right hand side of equation 5.1 represents the utility a household receives when
deciding to forgo purchase and stay in the market the next period. The second term on the right
hand side of the equation, Uist (ω, ; θ), represents the utility a household receives by choosing
optimally from the set of available products in the market.
In equation 5.1 the state variable ω and  are jointly determined from a conditional joint density
function G (ωt+1, t+1|ωt, t). By assuming conditional independence, the Bellman equation can
be rewritten to simplify the problem:1
Vit (ωt, t) = max{i0t + β
ˆ
ωt+1
ˆ
t+1
Vit+1 (ωt+1, t+1) f (t+1|ωt+1) dt+1h (ωt+1|ωt) dωt+1,
maxs∈{1,2,3,4}Uist (ωt, t; θ)} (5.2)
The joint densityG (ωt+1, t+1|ωt, t) from equation 5.1 is separated into two conditional densities.
The simplification implies that: (i) given today’s state, ωt, the ’s are independent over time, (ii)
conditional on today’s state, ωt, the next periods state ωt+1 is independent of t.
Since the utility from purchase does not include a continuation value it is helpful at this point
to focus on the utility from foregoing purchase. First, the inner-most integral is defined as:
EVit+1 (ωt+1) =
ˆ
t+1
Vit+1 (ωt+1, t+1; θ) f (t+1|ωt) dt+1 (5.3)
The type I extreme value distributional assumption for the  taste shocks simplifies the integral in
equation 5.3 to the familiar closed form solution:
EVit+1 (ωt+1) = log
[
S∑
s=1
e(Vit+1(ωt+1,s;θ)) + e(Vit+1(ωt+1,0;θ))
]
(5.4)
The expected future utility from choosing to postpone purchase is simplified as the integration
1Rust (1994) discusses complications when estimating the model specified above, and introduces several stan-
dard assumptions to reduce computational complexity and ensure consistency. The only one discussed here is
the conditional independence assumption. Conditional independence is satisfied if and only if the joint density
p (ωt+1, t+1|ωt, t) can be factored as f (t+1|ωt+1) g (ωt+1|ωt).
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of equation 5.4 over the stochastic state variables. The expected future utility from choosing to
postpone purchase is defined as the function:
EVit (ωt, t; θ) =
ˆ
ωt+1
EVit+1 (ωt+1)h (ωt+1|ωt) (5.5)
The revised maximization problem is rewritten using the notation above as:
Vit (ωt, t; θ) = max
{
i0t + βEVit (ωt, t; θ) , maxs∈{1,2,3,4}Uist (ωt, t, s; θ)
}
(5.6)
The estimation strategy relies on maximum likelihood estimation to recover the parameters
of the model. The likelihood function for the market is the product of the conditional choice
probability and the conditional density for the state variables over the households in the market,
sample period, and the choice set.
L (θ) =
∏
i∈Mt
T∏
t=1
∏
k∈S
[Pr (sit|ωt; θ)Pr (ωt|ωt−1)]1(sit=k) (5.7)
The full log-likelihood for the dynamic discrete choice model is:
LL (θ) =
∑
i∈Mt
T∑
t=1
∑
k∈S
1 (sit = k) [log (Pr (sit|ωt; θ)) + log (Pr (ωt|ωt−1; θ))] (5.8)
Maximizing the log-likelihood function in equation 5.8 is complicated and computationally
burdensome to solve. Rust (1994) proposes a three-stage estimation routine to reduce the com-
putation time, but allow for the estimation of consistent parameters. To reduce computation, the
full vector of parameters is split into two vectors, θ = {θf , θω} where the parameters in θω can be
estimated independently of the conditional choice probabilities and the parameters in θf are inde-
pendent of the state transitions. The full maximum likelihood estimation is split into two partial
likelihood equations. The log-likelihood is rewritten below to reflect the two-stage nature of the
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estimation strategy.
LL (θ) =
∑
i∈Mt
T∑
t=1
∑
k∈S
1 (sit = k) log (Pr (sit|ωt; θf , θω)) +
∑
i∈Mt
T∑
t=1
log (Pr (ωt|ωt−1; θω)) (5.9)
The first stage estimates the first order autoregressive process that governs household beliefs
regarding the transition of solar panel system prices. The parameters of the pricing process are
estimated using partial maximum likelihood estimation of the second term in equation 5.9, which
does not require the nested fixed point algorithm.2 Formally, solar panels system prices are as-
sumed to follow an AR(1) process with normally distributed iid errors of mean zero and variance
σ2P .
P SPt = θω1 + θω2P
SP
t−1 + νt (5.10)
Estimation of the pricing process assumes the first period price to be deterministic, fPSP1 (p
SP
1 ) =
1 and maximizes the partial likelihood conditional on the solar panel system price in the first pe-
riod. The partial conditional likelihood function is defined as:
Lω1 =
T∏
k=2
fPSPk |PSPk−1
(
pSPk |pSPk−1, θω
)
(5.11)
The partial conditional log likelihood is:
LLω1 =
T∑
k=2
log
[
1√
2Πσ2P
exp
(
−1
2
(pSPk − θω1 − θω2pSPk−1)2
σ2P
)]
(5.12)
Maximizing the equation 5.12 results in consistent estimates of the parameters θω1, θω2, and σP .
The vector of parameter estimates, θˆω, enter the second stage as consistent estimates. The
goal during the second stage of estimation is to recover the utility parameters and the continuation
value of staying in the market. As previously stated, within the sample period of the model the
value function is non-stationary and the inner-loop of the fixed point algorithm is not guaranteed to
2In the case of separate markets the parameter vector γ will be estimated for each MSA in the market.
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converge.3 To work around this problem, I assume the periods outside of the sample are stationary
and use the nested fixed point algorithm to solve for the vector of continuation values in the last
period.4 The final period in the sample is denoted by T and the vector of parameters θ = {θ̂ω, θf}
is compressed for space.
ViT (ωT , T ; θ) = max
{
i0T + βEViT (ωT , T ; θ) , maxs∈{1,2,3,4}UisT (ωT , T , s; θ)
}
(5.13)
In equation 5.13, the utility from choosing to purchase a solar panel system is modeled as a dis-
counted lifetime utility value, UisT (ωT , T , s; θ). The assumptions that households only purchase
one system in their lifetime and are assumed to not repeat purchase allows for modeling utility as
a one time transfer to the household. Also, the econometrician is able to ignore the current holding
of a solar panel system for each household and the state space is reduced which simplifies estima-
tion. Calculating the continuation value of waiting to purchase requires a more computationally
intensive approach and is the focus of the following discussion.
First, the continuation value for household i in the final period T is calculated and is represented
as:
EViT (ωT , T ; θ) =
ˆ
ωT+1
log
[
S∑
s=1
e(ViT+1(ωT+1,s;θ)) + e(ViT+1(ωT+1,0;θ))
]
h (ωT+1|ωT ) (5.14)
Equation 5.14 is estimated using an iterative approach that is a variant of the nested fixed point
algorithm described in Rust (1987, 1994). The time subscripts are dropped because of the sta-
tionarity assumption. From Rust (1994), the equation defining the fixed point EVθ is written as
Tθ(EVθ), where the nonlinear operator Tθ is a mapping from the Banach Space B back onto itself,
3One only needs to look as far as the effect of time until the end of a subsidy regime to find non-stationarity of the
value function. The non-stationarity breaks one of the main requirements for convergence of the nested fixed point
algorithm and we are no longer assured that the fixed point exists or is unique.
4Stationarity implies that the continuation value is Markovian, depends on the current state, and the continuation
value is time invariant. Given two periods, period t and t + k, where the state space is equivalent in both periods
ωt = ωt+k then the continuation value will be equivalent in each period. The time subscript can be dropped for
periods outside of the sample period and a fixed point can be reached.
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Tθ : B → B, and is defined by:
Tθ(W )(ω) =
ˆ
ω′
log
[
S∑
s=1
eW (ω
′,s;θ) + eW (ω
′,0;θ)
]
h(ω′|ω) (5.15)
=
ˆ
ω′
log
[
S∑
s=1
eUis(ω
′;θ) + eW (ω
′,0;θ)
]
h(ω′|ω) (5.16)
The algorithm begins with an initial guess for the vector of continuation values, EV 0i , and
an initial guess for the vector of utility parameters θ0f along with the estimated parameters θˆω
from the first stage. Given these initial values, the vector of continuation values is calculated as
EV 1i = Tθ(EV
0
i ).
EV 1i ≡ Tθ(EV 0i )(ω) =
ˆ
ω′
log
[
S∑
s=1
eUis(ω
′;θ) + eEV
0
i
]
h (ω′|ω) (5.17)
A second vector of continuation values is calculated using the same vector of parameters θ0f
and θ̂ω, but the newly calculated vector of continuation values EV 1i is used in place of the initial
guess EV 0i . The second vector of continuation values is calculated as EV
2
i = Tθ(EV
1
i ) using
equation 5.15.
EV 2i ≡ Tθ(EV 1i )(ω) =
ˆ
ω′
log
[
S∑
s=1
eUis(ω
′;θ) + eEV
1
i
]
h (ω′|ω) (5.18)
The calculated vectors of continuation values {EV 2i , EV 1i } are differenced for all individuals
and checked for convergence against a tolerance level of 1.0 × 10−13. If the differenced values
are within the tolerance level for all individuals then the iteration ends and convergence is accom-
plished. Otherwise, the algorithm repeats using the second calculated vector of continuation values
as the initial guess for the next iteration. This process continues until convergence is accomplished.
At convergence the final vector of continuation values is set as the calculated vector of con-
tinuation values ÊVi = EV
f
i ,∀i. From the calculated vector of continuation values, backwards
induction is used to calculate continuation values for all periods within the sample. Backwards in-
duction begins at period T-1 with the vector of continuation values as a function of the state space,
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the vector of parameters, and the period T ’s calculated continuation value.
ÊV iT−1
(
ωT−1, T−1; θ, ÊVi
)
=
ˆ
ωT
log
[
S∑
s=1
eUisT (ωT ;θ) + eÊV i
]
h (ωT |ωT−1) (5.19)
The backwards induction algorithm continues by iterating the process backwards through the sam-
ple period. The algorithm ends once the continuation value for the first period in the sample is
calculated.
ÊV i1 (ω1, 1; θ) =
ˆ
ω2
log
[
S∑
s=1
eUis2(ω2;θ) + eÊV i2(ω2;θ)
]
h (ω2|ω1) (5.20)
Given the calculated matrix of continuation values, the inner loop terminates and passes the
calculated values to the outer loop. The outer loop uses the estimated vector of parameters for
the solar panel price evolution and the calculated matrix of continuation values to estimate the
remaining utility parameters, θf , via maximum likelihood estimation by solving the following
maximization problem.
θˆf = argmax
∑
i∈Mt
T∑
t=1
∑
k∈S
1 (sit = k) log
[
Pr
(
sit | ωt; θf , θˆω
)]
(5.21)
The conditional choice probabilities Pr
(
sit | ωt; θf , θˆω
)
take on the familiar closed form solution
from the Type I Extreme Value distributional assumption for the ’s.
Pr (sit|ωt; θ) = exp (Vit (ωt, sit; θ))∑
k∈S exp (Vit (ωt, k; θ))
(5.22)
After recovering estimates for θˆf , the outer loop terminates and the algorithm repeats. The
newly estimated parameters θˆf are passed to the inner loop and the process of calculating the
matrix of continuation values repeats. The algorithm continues to iterate the nested loops until the
difference in the likelihood values of two iterations is below the tolerance level.
The parameter estimates from the first stage are consistent, but the process of maximizing
the likelihood in two stages introduces estimation error into the second stage. The covariance
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variance matrix formed by inverting the fisher information matrix from the partial likelihood in
equation 5.21 will be inconsistent. The inconsistency is due to the presence of estimation error
from the first stage estimate of θ̂ω that is brought into the second stage estimation routine. A third
stage is introduced to correct the inconsistency in the covariance matrix by maximizing the full
log-likelihood function using the consistent estimated parameters from the first and second stage
θ̂ = {θ̂f , θ̂ω} as initial values for maximizing the full log likelihood equation.
The third stage uses the Newton-step estimator to maximize the full log-likelihood. The
Newton-steps are calculated as the difference between the current vector of parameters, θ̂c, and
a step size parameter γ multiplied by the search direction term.
θ̂n = θ̂c − γŜ(θ̂c) (5.23)
The search direction, Ŝ, is calculated using the negative of the information matrix for the
full log-likelihood.5 The Newton step estimator is shown to produce parameter estimates that
are asymptotically equivalent to full information maximum likelihood and will produce consistent
estimates of the covariance matrix.
From the estimated parameters in the third stage, standard errors are calculated using the in-
verse of the Fisher Information matrix. The Fisher Information matrix is estimated by taking the
expectation of outer product of the score of the log-likelihood equation.
Î(θˆ)i,j = E
[
∂
∂θˆi
LL(θˆ)× ∂
∂θˆj
LL(θˆ)
∣∣∣∣∣θˆ
]
(5.24)
Equation 5.24 is equivalent to the covariance variance matrix of the score of the log-likelihood
function with respect to the estimated parameters θ̂. The standard error for the estimated vector of
parameters is calculated as the square root of the quotient of the inverse of the Fisher Information
5The search direction is typically calculated using the Hessian matrix for the Newton steps. From the information
matrix equality for maximum likelihood estimation, we know that the expected value of the Hessian of the log-
likelihood function equals the negative of the expected value of the outer product of its gradient.
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Matrix and the number of observations for each parameter k.6
sˆ(θˆk) =
(
Î−1(θˆ)k,k∑T
t=1Nt
) 1
2
(5.25)
6The Cramer-Rao bound states that the inverse of the Fisher Information matrix is a lower bound on the variance
of any unbiased estimator.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS
In this chapter, I present demand estimates for both static and dynamic models and compare
the results. First, I discuss two static models: 1) reduced form and 2) structural static model of
consumer demand. Next, I discuss the first stage of the dynamic model and assumptions regarding
the evolution of solar panel prices. Then, I present second stage estimates for the three specifica-
tions of the dynamic demand model. Next, I present evidence with respect to the models ability to
fit the data. Lastly, I end the chapter with an analysis of demand estimates using price elasticities
and marginal effects.
6.1 Static Models
I specify two static models of solar panel system purchase as a baseline comparison for the
dynamic specifications. The first model follows Hughes and Podolefksy (2013) and investigates
the relationship between the number of installations and subsidy rates. Second, I present a static
structural model of solar panel purchase under the assumption that households are myopic. In the
following section, I briefly discuss the specifications and present the parameter estimates.
First, I model the relationship between the number of solar panel installations per day and the
available subsidy rate. In Equation 6.1 the number of installations in period t, Qt, is regressed on
the per watt subsidy rate τt, semi-annual fixed effects θ3,y, and an iid error term t.
Qt = θ1 + θ2τt + θ3,y + t (6.1)
I present the descriptive statistics for the number of installations per day and the subsidy rate in
Table 6.1. The unconditional mean of the number of installations per day is 6.97 with a variance of
359.43 that is over 51 times the mean. In Table 6.2 the conditional mean and variance is presented
Variable Obs Mean Var Min Max
# Installations 1826 6.97 359.43 0 438
Subsidy Rate 1826 3.68 0.83 2.60 5.14
Table 6.1: Number of Installations Per Day (Unconditional)
Semi-Annual Obs Mean Var Min Max
Jan-Jun 2002 181 2.70 16.23 0 20
Jul-Dec 2002 184 2.48 26.02 0 29
Jan-Jun 2003 181 8.38 1133.25 0 438
Jul-Dec 2003 184 8.50 447.08 0 160
Jan-Jun 2004 182 6.44 115.79 0 78
Jul-Dec 2004 184 4.90 87.72 0 67
Jan-Jun 2005 181 3.77 53.58 0 61
Jul-Dec 2005 184 8.23 56.47 0 37
Jan-Jun 2006 181 11.64 1017.46 0 336
Jul-Dec 2006 184 12.65 555.60 0 209
Table 6.2: Number of Installations Per Day Conditional on 6-Month Bins
for the number of installations per 6-month period. In all 6-month periods, the conditional variance
is greater than the conditional mean. These findings suggest that the count data is overdispersed
and that a Poisson model may not be appropriate. I estimate Equation 6.1 using both Poisson and
Negative Binomial regressions and test for overdispersion.
I show the results of estimation of Equation 6.1 in Table 6.3. The Poisson and Negative Bino-
mial regressions are estimated with annual fixed effects and semi-annual fixed effects. In Table 6.3
the first two columns of results are estimated with annual fixed effects. The parameter estimates
for the subsidy rate are not significant in either the Poisson and Negative Binomial regression re-
sults. The third and fourth column of results are estimated with semi-annual fixed effects and are
the preferred estimates.1 The parameter on the subsidy rate is negative with a coefficient of -0.607
that is significant at the 1% level for both specifications. This implies that a 1 unit change in the
subsidy rate will decrease the log count of the number of installations by 0.607. I find that a $0.10
1I perform a Likelihood Ratio test comparing the Poisson model to the Negative Binomial model. The Likelihood
Ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the overdispersion parameter is zero with a chi-squared value of 2134.2 with
one degree of freedom in favor of the Negative Binomial model.
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Poisson Neg. Binomial Poisson Neg. Binomial
Subsidy Rate -0.085 0.322 -0.607*** -0.607***
(0.089) (0.437) (0.019) (0.070)
% Change in Installations -0.83% 0.3% -4.6% -4.6%
Constant 1.392 0.787 4.118*** 4.118***
(0.456) (2.239) (0.062) (0.281)
6-month Effects N N Y Y
Year Effects Y Y N N
LL -15738.417 -4946.49 -15560.34 -4935.736
Wald Chi2 2725.80 143.28 3081.95 164.79
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 1826 1826 1826 1826
Table 6.3: Models for Daily Installations
increase in the subsidy rate will decrease the number of installations by 4.6%. This result is counter
to theory and suggests that a different model is needed to capture the complexity of the decision to
purchase.2
The second model is a myopic specification of the structural model discussed in Chapter 3.
I specify two versions of the model. First, I estimate the model without a present value term.
Second, I include capacity and capacity squared to capture utility from having a larger capacity
system installed.
The utility specification for the first case of the static model for household i choosing system s
is:
Uist (ωt, t; θ, α) =

θ1 + θ2izt − αiln
((
pSPist − τst
)
qsps
)
+ θ3MSAi + ist s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
i0t s = 0
I present the estimates for the static model in Table 6.4. The first column describes the estimates
from the first specification of the static model. The parameter estimates are of the expected sign.
Households receive disutility, albeit close to zero, from higher net prices with both medium and
high value homes receiving less disutility relative to the low value homes. In the second column,
2Additional models are estimated using the number of semi-annual purchases. I present the results of estimation
in Table C.1 located in the Appendix.
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I show estimates from the second specification of the static model that includes a capacity and
capacity squared term. Similarly, I find that the parameter estimates are of the expected sign. The
capacity terms help soak up variation in purchase related to changes in the present value due to
the correlation between capacity and the present value of purchase. Parameter estimates show that
households get positive utility from larger capacity systems with diminishing returns starting at
7.3 kW. The estimated coefficient on the net price is much larger in magnitude relative to the first
specification with a value of -1.791 indicating that households are more responsive to prices than
in the first model. The larger magnitude price coefficient is consistent with findings in the literature
regarding price sensitivity in durable good markets with highly priced goods.
The second specification estimates are the preferred results from the structural static model. I
perform a likelihood ratio test and reject the null model, specification 1, in favor of specification 2
with a LR test statistic of 399.24 from a chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom.
In the reduced form model, I find a negative relationship between the number of installations
and the subsidy rate. The result implies that demand slopes upward, and the current policy over-
subsidizes the solar panel market. The static structural model corrects the under-predicting of price
elasticities by explicitly modeling the households decision problem. From the static structural
model, I find that households are price elastic and that the number of purchases would be increased
by more aggressive subsidies. The concern with the static structural model is how the estimated
parameters are impacted by non-purchase. The model will have a tendency to over-predict the
parameter on price to rationalize households delaying purchase.
6.2 Dynamic Models
I describe the results of the dynamic consumer demand model presented in Chapter 3. The
estimates are presented for each of the deterministic belief structures regarding future subsidy
regimes. I begin with a discussion about the first stage estimates for the pricing process and present
the results of estimation. Next, I discuss the second stage of estimation and present results for each
of the three belief cases. Lastly, I simulate and discuss price elasticities and the marginal effects of
technological innovation.
In the first stage of the dynamic model, I estimate the first-order autoregressive process for the
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(1) (2)
Efficiency (%) 0.446*** 0.645*
(0.010) (0.016)
Eff*Small Roof 0.150*** 0.150*
(0.002) (0.002)
Eff*Medium Roof 0.064*** 0.064*
(0.001) (0.001)
ln Net Price ($) -0.118** -1.791*
(0.02) (0.095)
ln Net Price*Med Value 0.037*** 0.037*
(0.002) (0.002)
ln Net Price*High Value 0.016*** 0.016*
(0.002) (0.002)
Capacity (kW) 0.993*
(0.053)
Capacity2 -0.068*
(0.004)
Constant -9.523*** 1.95
(0.199) ()
MSA FE Y Y
LL -100487.68 -100288.06
Number Of Observations 505558 505558
Table 6.4: Static Model Estimation Results
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Statewide L.A. S.F. S.D. Fresno
Lagged Price 0.932*** 0.940*** 0.927*** 0.893*** 0.970***
(0.048) (0.091) (0.039) (0.070) (0.055)
Constant 0.297 0.244 0.364 0.579 -0.097
(0.426) (0.815) (0.331) (0.599) (0.404)
σµ 0.338 0.509 0.359 0.476 0.469
Observations 21 21 21 21 21
Table 6.5: First Stage Estimation Results from 2001-2010
evolution of solar panel system prices. I estimate two specifications of the pricing process. First,
I estimate Equation 6.2 for each MSA i. Second, I estimate an alternative specification using the
same equation but that is aggregated to the state level. To aggregate the values, I use a weighted
average of solar panel prices across capacities and MSA to create a statewide average price per
watt.
P SPit+1 = δi1 + δi2P
SP
it + µit+1 (6.2)
The estimated parameters for both specifications of the AR(1) process are presented in Table
6.5. In the first column I present the estimated coefficients for the second specification. I find the
estimated parameter on lagged price positive and significant with a magnitude of 0.932. In the
second through fifth column, I present the estimated coefficients from the first specification. I find
that all parameter estimates on lagged price are significant and of magnitudes that vary from 0.970
in Fresno to 0.893 in San Diego. I use the statewide estimated coefficients for the second stage of
the dynamic model given the similarities between the estimates.
The second stage of estimation maximizes the log likelihood of the conditional choice prob-
abilities given the estimates from the first stage. I estimate three specifications of the model that
correspond to the deterministic belief structures discussed in Chapter 3: Perfect Foresight (PF),
Pessimism (Pes), and Auto-renewal (AR). In Table 6.6, I present the estimates for each specifica-
tion. The columns vary by the belief structure imposed on households. In the three specifications
I assume a 2.2% escalation for the price of electricity, a 0.9% per-period solar panel degradation
rate, and a discount rate of β = 0.95 for both future utility and income. I use 50 Halton draws to
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approximate the integral for the price distribution for the pessimism and auto-renewal specifica-
tions.
The parameter estimates for both the natural log of the present value of purchase and the natural
log of the net price are significant and of the correct sign across all specifications. I find that
households, on average, prefer larger present value benefits from purchase. Also, households gain
disutility from higher net prices, and consumers in medium and high value homes receive less
disutility from net prices relative to the low housing value population. The results suggest that
price responsiveness and subsidy responsiveness in the California solar panel system market varies
by housing value.
The difference across dynamic specifications in the present value and net price parameters are
a result of the differences in the household beliefs regarding future subsidy regimes. The dynamic
model allows households to make purchasing decisions on both the level of prices within the period
and the expected change in the price between periods.
If prices are falling rapidly households may wait to purchase until the expected change in prices
is closer to zero. In this sense, a household’s belief about a future subsidy directly affects the
household’s expectation about future prices and impacts, in the dynamic sense, their expectation
about the change in price over time.
In the case of pessimism, the estimated parameter on the net price is less in magnitude than the
estimated parameter in the auto-renewal case. This accords with expectations regarding the effect
of pessimistic beliefs on the estimated parameters. The total number of purchase increases from
630, in 2002, to over 1800, in 2003 after the second subsidy regime. Under the assumption that
households believe that no future subsidies exist, a household in the first subsidy regime expects the
change in future prices to be large and positive. Given the belief, the model rationalizes household
behavior by reducing the magnitude of the parameter on net price. The reduction is due to the
combination of the expected change in price being large and positive, and the increase in quantity
demanded occurring after the subsidy change.
A similar logic holds for the auto-renewal case, households believe that the next subsidy regime
will offer a subsidy rate equal to the current regime’s final rate. Additional to the subsidy belief,
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Sub Belief PF Pes AR
Solar Price - State State
ln PV ($) 1.180*** 1.139*** 1.198***
(0.048) (0.073) (0.074)
Efficiency (%) 0.659*** 0.646*** 0.659***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
Eff*Small Roof 0.163*** 0.162*** 0.164***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Eff*Med Roof 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.075***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ln Net Price ($) -1.359*** -1.314*** -1.380***
(0.052) (0.079) (0.08)
Price*Med Value 0.041*** 0.0414*** 0.0419***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Price*High Value 0.019** 0.0190*** 0.0195***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -11.346 -11.262 -11.312
MSA FE Y Y Y
LL -100041.87 -100042.53 -100036.21
# Of Obs 505558 505558 505558
Escalation Rate 2.2% 2.2% 2.2%
Halton Draws - 50 50
Table 6.6: Second Stage Estimation Results
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households expect prices to decline. The combination of expectations about prices and beliefs
about subsidies generates the expectation that net prices are falling. The expectation of lower
prices in the future increases the household’s value of waiting to purchase. Using the same example
as above, the model rationalizes household behavior as price responsiveness and increases the
magnitude of the coefficient on the net price.
I find consistency in the estimated parameter on efficiency rate and the interaction between
efficiency rate and roof size across the three specifications. The estimated parameter on efficiency
rate is positive and significant indicating that, on average, households prefer a higher efficiency
rate. Also, I find that households with the smallest rooftop space prefer higher efficiency rates
relative to both medium and large rooftop homes. This accords with the argument suggested in
Chapter 2 regrading smaller rooftop space households preferring a higher efficiency rate due to the
constraints or extra costs of installing a physically larger size system. Interestingly, the estimated
parameters on efficiency rates do not vary over the static and dynamic specifications. This pattern
can be explained by the small changes in efficiency rates between periods or that the expected
change in technology might not have been a significant factor in the households dynamic decision
to purchase.
6.3 Model Fit
I check the appropriateness of additional variables for observable heterogeneity by running the
following likelihood ratio tests for each specification.
1. Heterogeneity by Housing Value: H0 : α2 = α3 = 0, Ha : α2 6= α3 6= 0
2. Heterogeneity by Rooftop Space: H0 : θ32 = θ33 = 0, Ha : θ32 6= θ33 6= 0
3. Medium and High Housing Values: H0 : α2 = α3, Ha : α2 6= α3
4. Small and Medium Rooftop Space: H0 : θ32 = θ33, Ha : θ32 6= θ33
The first likelihood ratio test compares the fit of a null model in which there is no heterogeneity in
preferences across the distribution of housing values to the fit of the full model. I reject the null
61
hypothesis in favor of the full model for all specifications.3 The second likelihood ratio test com-
pares the fit of a null model where there is no heterogeneity in preferences across the distribution
of rooftop space to the fit of the full model. I reject the null hypothesis in favor of the full model
for all specifications.4 The third likelihood ratio test compares the fit of a null model in which
preferences for prices are the same across households in the top two terciles of the housing value
distribution to the fit of the full model. I reject the null model in favor of the full model for all
specifications.5 The fourth likelihood ratio test compares the fit of a null model where household
preferences for efficiency rates are the same across the bottom two terciles of the rooftop space
distribution to the fit of the full model above. In all specifications, I reject the null model in favor
of the full model.
I report choice probabilities in Table 6.7 by specification and time period. The first column of
the table identifies the specification of the model that corresponds with the choice probabilities.
The first row of probabilities are the empirical choice probabilities from the CEC dataset. The
next three rows are the simulated choice probabilities for each specification of the model. The
choice probabilities are small with the largest, in the last period, equaling a half of one percent
probability of purchase. This is a result of the low number of purchases during the sample period
relative to the market size. I find that all three dynamic specifications fit the empirical choice
probabilities closely. The model over-predicts the choice probabilities during the first two periods
where the least amount of purchases occur, but as the number of purchases increase the simulated
probabilities match the empirical probabilities closer. Also, I find small differences in the simulated
choice probabilities between the specifications of the dynamic model.
3The perfect foresight model rejects the null hypothesis with a likelihood ratio statistic of 251.16, the pessimism
model rejects the null with a likelihood ratio statistic of 250.33, and the auto-renewal case rejects the null with a
likelihood ratio statistics of 245.82 with 2 degrees of freedom.
4The perfect foresight model rejects the null hypothesis with a likelihood ratio statistic of 4892.92, the pessimism
model rejects the null with a likelihood ratio statistic of 4880.48, and the auto-renewal case rejects the null with a
likelihood ratio statistics of 4886.10 with 2 degrees of freedom.
5The perfect foresight model rejects the null hypothesis with a likelihood ratio statistic of 76.21, the pessimism
model rejects the null with a likelihood ratio statistic of 77.95, and the auto-renewal case rejects the null with a
likelihood ratio statistics of 76.26 and 1 degree of freedom.
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In Table 6.8, I present choice probabilities by specification, time, and capacity bin. The first
column of the table identifies the specification associated with the choice probabilities, and the
second column identifies the capacity bin. The simulated choice probabilities in general fit closely
with the empirical probabilities across capacity bins. In capacity bin 1, the model under-predicts in
2003 and 2003.5 following the subsidy regime change, and over-predicts in the last period before
the regime change. Similarly, the model over-predicts the simulated choice probabilities in capacity
bin 4 in the first two periods prior to the regime change, and under-predicts in the final period.
The instances of larger differences between the empirical and simulated choice probabilities are
correlated with time periods close to the regime changes.
6.4 Elasticities
I present short-run and long-run price elasticities in Table 6.9.6 The short-run price elasticities
are calculated as a 1% temporary price increase across all products for one period. Households
have full information about the duration of the price increase and form expectations about future
prices knowing that the price change is not persistent. The price increase is unknown to the house-
holds until the beginning of the period it occurs. I find that simulated price elasticities, on average,
are elastic in the short run. The average short-run price elasticity is -1.387 in the perfect foresight
case, -1.310 in the pessimism case, and the average price elasticity is -1.390 in the auto-renewal
case.
In the perfect foresight case, I find that medium housing value households are the most price
elastic with an average elasticity of -1.447 followed by the high housing value households at -
1.379, and the low housing value households with an elasticity of -1.354. In the pessimism case,
I find that low housing value households are the most price elastic with an elasticity measure of
-1.350 followed by the high housing value households at -1.296, and medium value homes being
the least price elastic with -1.276. In the autorenewal case, I find that low housing value households
are least price elastic at -1.231 followed by medium value homes at -1.415, and high value homes
being the most price elastic with an elasticity of -1.515.
6The price elasticities presented in Table 6.9 are taken from middle of the sample period, the first six-month period
of 2004, and averaged over 50 simulations.
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Specification Housing Value Short Run Long Run
Static All -1.854 -
Perfect Foresight All -1.387 -1.290
High -1.379 -1.291
Med -1.447 -1.373
Low -1.354 -1.229
Pessimism All -1.310 -1.198
High -1.296 -1.213
Med -1.276 -1.164
Low -1.350 -1.205
Autorenewal All -1.390 -1.128
High -1.515 -1.417
Med -1.415 -1.333
Low -1.231 -1.089
Table 6.9: Price Elasticity Given a 1% Increase in Price
I present simulated long-run price elasticities in Table 6.9 by permanently increasing prices
across capacity by 1%. The price increase is persistent from the period it is initialized onwards.
Households in the market have full information regarding the persistence of the price increase, but
are not aware of the price increase until the period it begins. Simulated price elasticities indicate
that households are price elastic, with an average long-run price elasticity of -1.198 in the pes-
simism case and -1.128 in the autorenewal case. The difference between short-run and long-run
price elasticities suggest that households are price elastic in the solar panel system market and are
willing to substitute demand intertemporally in the presence of higher prices.
The marginal effect of a change in efficiency rates on the probability of purchase are presented
in Table 6.10. The table consists of three columns representing the model specification, house-
holds, and long-run marginal effect. The results indicate that a permanent 1% increase in efficiency
rates increases the probability of purchase by an average of 6.46% across all specifications. The
consistency across specifications is not surprising given the estimates from the model.
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Specification Roof Size Long Run
PF Market 6.46
No Future Market 6.45
Auto-renewal Market 6.48
Table 6.10: Marginal Effect of a 1% Increase in Efficiency Rates
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CHAPTER 7
COUNTERFACTUALS
In the first counterfactual, I simulate the solar panel system market without subsidies. I report
the results for each specification of the dynamic model below. For each specification, I present
two tables of results. In the first table I present the simulated number of purchases from the full
model, simulated purchases without government intervention, and the percent change in purchase
attributed to removing the subsidies. In the second table, I report the percent change of purchase
due to the removal of subsidies by capacity bin over the sample period. For the counterfactuals,
I assume that suppliers are perfectly price elastic so prices do not vary with respect to changes in
subsidies.
I present the results from the counterfactual simulation for the pessimism case in Table 7.1
and Table 7.2.1 In the first row of Table 7.1, I report the simulated number of purchases with
subsidies. In the second row, I present the number of simulated purchases without subsidies, and
in the third row I report the percentage change in purchase. I find the largest percentage loss of
purchase, -68.04%, occurs during the early periods of the sample. Also, I find that over the sample
period the percentage loss of purchase decreases reaching a minimum level of 38.73% in 2006.
There are two main factors driving the decrease in percentage loss over time. First, households can
intertemporally substitute demand and forgo purchase until a later period. Second, the removal of
subsidies increases the price households face in earlier periods of the model. This occurs for two
reasons. First, prices are higher in earlier periods relative to later in the sample. Second, subsidies
are larger in earlier periods of the sample. Lastly, I find that in the absence of subsidies the total
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number of solar panel system purchases decrease by 49.22% from 12,687.42 to 6442.57.
In Table 7.2, I simulate the number of purchases by capacity bin and report the percent change
in purchase after the removal of government subsidies. The first column identifies the capacity
of the solar panel system. For each capacity, I report the percentage change in purchase for each
period in the sample. I find a pattern of decreasing percentage loss of purchase over time similar
to Table 7.1. Additionally, I find the largest percentage loss of purchase for most periods in the
sample occurring for large and extra-large capacity solar panel systems. Part of the result could be
driven by reasons discussed in the previous paragraph: intertemporal demand substitution and the
percentage reduction in price over time. Additionally, the higher percentage of loss of purchase
could be a result of households substituting between capacity levels. Policy makers are interested
in the impact of subsidies on the number of residential installations of solar panel systems. Also,
policy makers are interested in the total amount of capacity (kW) of solar generation installed from
policy intervention.
I find that 49.57% of the total capacity installed during the sample period is directly attributable
to the subsidy program.2 In Table 7.3, I present the additional amount of capacity installed for each
system size and over the sample period with the subsidy. In all periods, I find that the large and
extra-large solar panel systems makeup the majority share of capacity installed. Overall, large and
extra-large solar panel systems contribute 69.73% of the total solar capacity installed for purchases
directly attributable to the subsidy program. The total capacity installed by households that only
purchase with subsidies is shown in Figure 7.1. Of the total capacity installed, I find that 41.23%
is due to extra-large capacity installations, 28.5% is due to large capacity installations, 18.69% is
due to medium capacity installations, and 11.58% come from small capacity installations. The
finding suggests that the subsidy program is both incentivizing households to purchase solar panel
installations and importantly larger capacity installations.
I extend the analysis beyond the removal of subsidies and simulate purchases for different
1I present results from the counterfactual simulations for the perfect foresight case in Tables C.4 and C.5 and the
auto-renewal case in Tables C.7 and C.8. The results are similar across all three specifications.
2In the case where subsidies are removed that total capacity in the market reduces by 23,545.44 kW.
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Figure 7.1: Additional Capacity Installed with Subsidy by Capacity Bin
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percentage levels of the subsidy. In Figure 7.2, I represent the number of installations as a function
of the percentage of subsidy rates offered during the sample. The vertical axis represents the
number of installations aggregated over the sample period, and the horizontal axis represents the
percentage of the subsidy rate. The horizontal axis is discretized into 10% bins ranging from 0%
to 120%. I simulate purchases by setting the subsidy rates to the chosen percentage of the original
subsidy rate and run the counterfactual. Then, I aggregate the number of purchases across capacity
bin and time and report it as a black dot on the figure. The vertical dashed line represents 100% of
the subsidy and the horizontal dashed line represents the number of simulated purchases with the
actual subsidy rates. I find that at any percentage below 100% of the subsidy rate the number of
purchases is below the horizontal line.
In Table 7.4, I calculate the marginal increase in the number of installations per 10% increase.
The columns are separated into bins that match the horizontal axis in Figure 7.2. The first row in
each column represents the total number of installations given the percentage of the subsidy rate. In
the second row, I calculate the percentage change in the number of installations with respect to the
10% increase in the subsidy rate. In the third row, I calculate the change in the level of installations
given the 10% increase in the subsidy rate. For example in the 30% column, I report a percentage
change of 5.87% in the number of installations and a level increase of 420.49 installations. The
values are calculated using the difference in the number of installations from 20% to 30% subsidy
rates.
I find that there are increasing returns to the subsidy rate. In Table 7.4, I show that the percent-
age increase in purchases becomes larger with each additional 10% of the subsidy added. At the
point where the subsidy is increased beyond the rate offered in the sample the percentage increase
in purchase is greater than the percentage increase in the subsidy.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I analyze households’ decisions to purchase a residential-level solar panel
system. The solar panel system market is characterized by large upfront costs, differentiated prod-
ucts, technological innovation, decreasing prices, and uncertainty regarding future government
subsidies. I use a newly assembled dataset to estimate demand for solar panel installations that
cover a sample period from 2002 through 2006.
The first result is directly related to the uncertainty inherent in the use of short-lived subsidy
regimes. I find no evidence that household behavior is affected by the uncertainty regarding future
subsidy regimes. Further, I do not observe evidence of anticipatory behavior occurring in the solar
panel market during the sample period. These findings suggest that short term solar policies can
be used with minimal loss to the number of purchases or the total capacity installed.
Second, I find that households in the solar panel market are price elastic with short-run elastic-
ities greater in magnitude relative to long-run elasticities. I find that price elasticities vary across
the distribution of housing values. This suggests that there are potential efficiency gains through
income-based subsidy targeting. Also, I find that technological innovation in the form of increas-
ing efficiency rates is significant. The marginal effect of a 1% increase in efficiency rates increases
the probability of purchase by 6.4%. This value is large given that efficiency rates increase by 30%
during the sample period.
Third, I find that the subsidy regimes during the sample period incentivize household purchase
of solar panel systems. I find that 49.5% of solar panel system installations from 2002 through
2006 are directly attributable to subsidies. Also, I find that within the set of purchases related to
subsidies that larger capacity systems provide 70% of the total capacity installed.
APPENDIX A
ASSUMPTIONS AND COPULAS
A.1 Assumptions
In the full model, households simultaneously choose their consumption of electricity and pur-
chasing decision during each period. The electricity consumption decision is not modeled due to
constraints on data availability for electricity use and plan information at the household level. In-
stead, two assumptions separate the decision of electricity consumption and purchase.
Assumption 1: Electricity is a homogeneous good.
Assumption 1 suggests that households are indifferent about the source of electricity. Specifi-
cally, utility from consuming electricity is not differentiated between solar and traditional sources,
(i.e., the grid).
Assumption 2: Households face average electricity prices, peit (q) = p¯ite.
Assumption 2 restricts the model’s ability to capture the effect of the purchasing decision on
the marginal price of electricity for households. In a tiered-pricing environment, the decision to
generate solar electricity potentially decreases the marginal price of traditional electricity from the
grid. The reduction in marginal price of electricity, holding everything else constant, would in-
crease the quantity demanded of total electricity consumption.1 Without data on household pricing
plans and use information, considering this effect is difficult. Instead, the average price of elec-
tricity within each region is assumed to be the price that households care about when making an
electricity consumption decision.
These assumptions reduce the explanatory power of the model in two ways. First, an electricity
consumption decision is independent of the purchasing decision. This is potentially restrictive
when thinking about the change in total electricity consumption after purchasing solar panels due to
a change in the marginal price of electricity. Second, estimating the effect electricity consumption
at the household level has on the decision to purchase is impossible. These assumptions allow
1In the baseline tiered pricing scheme households are charged higher prices as consumption increases.
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estimation of the model without access to electricity use data while accounting for the monetary
benefit of installing solar panels.
A.2 Brief Summary of Copula Functions
The purpose of this appendix is to provide the reader with a detailed description of the process
used to simulate households that were not included in the CEC dataset. These households are
needed to fill the population of nonpurchasers during the sample period and to be used for counter-
factual simulations. The goal is to simulate a dataset of households for each zip code in the state
of California.
To simulate the population of households, marginal distribution data was obtained from Dataquick.
The data includes marginal distribution measures for housing value, number of bedrooms, number
of stories, square footage, and year built for single family dwellings at the zip code level. For each
characteristic the data includes the following information about the marginal distribution:
• Count
• Mean
• Median
• Standard Deviation
• Quintiles
Theses measures provide information about the first two moments of the distribution and a coarse
look at the shape of the distribution using the quintiles. Additional to the data regarding the indi-
vidual marginal distributions, the data include correlation measures between each of the housing
characteristics. This allows for a covariance-variance matrix to be constructed for houses in each
zip code.
1. Copulas
• Let a function C :[0, 1]d → [0, 1] be a copula if there is a probability space (Ω, F, P )
supporting a random vector (U1, . . . , Ud) such that Uk ∼ U [0, 1] for all k = 1, . . . , d
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and
C (u1, . . . , ud) = P (U1 ≤ u1, . . . , Ud ≤ ud), u1, . . . , ud ∈ [0, 1]
• Let F1(x1), . . . , Fd(xd) be the marginal distributions for the random variables
• The copulas are functions that connect multivariate distributions to their one-dimensional
margins with a dependence parameter θ.
H (x1, . . . , xd) = C (F1 (x1) , . . . , Fd (xd) ; θ)
2. Gaussian Copula
• Let (X1, . . . , Xd) be a normally distributed random with joint distribution function
F (x1, . . . , xd) =ˆ
×di=1(−∞,xi]
(2pi)−
d
2 det (Σ)−
1
2 exp
(
−1
2
(s− µ) Σ−1 (s− µ)′
)
ds
• Σ is a symmetric positive definite matrix with the diagonal entires representing the
variances
• µ is a mean vector
• The copula of (X1, . . . , Xd) is called the Gaussian copula and is given by
CGaussΣ (u1, . . . , ud) = H
(
F−11 (u1) , . . . , F
−1
d (ud)
)
3. Algorithm to Simulate Observations
(a) Pull observations from a multivariate normal distribution (y1, . . . , yd) ∼ MN(0,Σ)
where Σ is a matrix consisting of variance equal to one on the diagonal and the corre-
lation coefficients off diagonal.
(b) Retrieve the probabilities associated with the observations from step 1 by running
81
them through a univariate normal CDF with mean 0 and variance 1: (u1, . . . , ud) =
G (y1) , . . . G (yd) ∼ N(0, 1)
(c) Generate observations by taking the inverse of the marginal distributions with the prob-
abilities as inputs:
(
F−11 (u1), . . . F
−1
d (ud)
)
= (x1, . . . xd)
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APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL DATA CONSIDERATIONS
The purpose of the appendix is to provide the reader with additional information regarding
the dataset used in estimation. The appendix includes summary statistics, a figure that represents
monthly installations over the sample period, the California Solar Initiative subsidy schedule, an
example of a solar panel specification sheet, and two examples of a CEC public guidebook. The
first public guidebook discusses the details of the first subsidy regime during the sample period.
The second public guidebook details the second subsidy regime in the sample period. I include the
table of contents from each guidebook to provide the reader with a summary of the information
available to households at the beginning of a regime. Also, I provide the summary portion of the
guidebook that gives an overview of the program and the subsidy rates available.
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Capacity 3.78 1.94 0.095 9.99
System Price 36,794 18,437 1,073 158,012
Capacity-based Subsidy 12,718 7,161 213 52,043
Tax Credits 2,313 1,302 79 16,658
Electricity Rate 14.01 0.43 11.02 14.86
Solar Irradiation 4.99 0.26 3.87 5.83
Price per Watt 9.97 1.79 4.52 28.90
# of Installations 1386.17 901.64 7 2951
Table B.1: Summary Statistics
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Time
$/Watt #Installations
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
4.50
4.00
3.80
3.20
3.00
2.80
2.60
2.01 1.93
2.60
2.40
2.20
Actual Subsidy Per Watt
Scheduled Subsidy Per Watt
Subsidy Regime Change
Figure B.1: Number of Installations Per Month and Subsidy Rate
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175 Watt Photovoltaic Module 
BP 175B
6802.0006-v1   09/09
High-efficiency photovoltaic module using polycrystalline silicon cells
Mechanical Characteristics 
Dimensions  Length: 1593mm (62.8”) Width: 790mm (31.1”) Depth: 50mm (1.97”)
Weight 15.4 kg (34 pounds)
Solar Cells 72 cells (125mm x 125mm) in a 6x12 matrix connected in series
Output Cables  RHW-2 AWG# 12 (4mm
2
), cable with polarized weatherproof DC rated 
Multicontact connectors; asymmetrical lengths — 1250mm(-) and 800mm(+) 
Diodes IntegraBus™ technology includes Schottky by-pass diodes integrated into the printed 
circuit board bus
Construction Front: High-transmission and anti-reflective 3mm (1/8th in) tempered glass; 
Back: Black Polyester; Encapsulant: EVA
Frame  Anodized aluminum Universal frame; Color: Black
Electrical Characteristics2 BP 175B
Maximum power (Pmax)
3 175W
Voltage at Pmax (Vmp) 35.8V
Current at Pmax (Imp) 4.9A
Warranted minimum Pmax 166.3W
Short-circuit current (Isc) 5.47A 
Open-circuit voltage (Voc) 43.6V
Temperature coefficient of Isc (0.065±0.015)%/ °C
Temperature coefficient of Voc -(160±20)mV/°C
Temperature coefficient of power  -(0.5±0.05)%/°C 
NOCT (Air 20°C; Sun 0.8kW/m2; wind 1m/s) 47±2°C
Maximum series fuse rating 15A 
Maximum system voltage 600V (U.S. NEC rating)
Performance
Rated power (Pmax) 175W
Power Tolerance ±5%
Nominal voltage 24V
Limited Warranty1 25 years
Configuration
B Bronze frame with output cables and polarized 
Multicontact (MC) connectors
1. Warranty: Power output for 25 years. Freedom from defects in materials and workmanship for 5 years. See our website for full terms 
of these warranties.
2. This data represents the performance of typical BP Solar products, and are based on measurements made in accordance with 
ASTM E1036 corrected to SRC (STC.)
3. During the stabilization process that occurs during the first few months of deployment, module power may decrease by approximately 
1% from typical Pmax. 
©BP Solar 2009
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Quality and Safety 
Module power measurements calibrated to World Radiometric Reference through
ESTI (European Solar Test Installation at Ispra, Italy)
Listed by Underwriter’s Laboratories for electrical and fire safety 
(Class C fire rating)
Included with each module: self-tapping grounding screw, instruction sheet and warranty documents.
6802.0006-v1   09/09©BP Solar 2009
Module Diagram
Dimensions in brackets are in inches. Un-bracketed dimensions are in millimeters. Overall tolerances ±3mm (1/8”).
(+)
(-)
Max screw 
head projections
8 places
27 [1.06]
ESTI
Note: This publication summarizes product warranty and specifications, which are subject to change without notice.     
Additional information may be found on our web site: www.bpsolar.us
Qualification Test Parameters
Temperature cycling range -40°C to +85°C  (-40°F to 185°F)
Humidity freeze, damp heat 85% RH
Static load front and back (e.g. wind) 45psf (2160Pa) 
Hailstone impact 25mm (1 inch) at 23 m/s (52 mph)
0.0
0 20 40   60
Voltage (V) 
Cu
rr
en
t(A
)
T=0°C
T=25°C
T=50°C
T=75°C
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
BP 175B I-V Curves
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3technologies that utilize renewable fuels, and wind turbines of not more than ten
kilowatts (kW) rated electrical capacity per customer site. The law further states
that these four technologies are only eligible to participate in the program if they
meet the emerging technology eligibility criteria contained in the Commission's
March 1997 Policy Report on AB 1890 Renewables Funding.
Based on Commission staff research (e.g., Energy Technology Status Report,
Targeted RD&D studies), docketed information, and testimonials by various
interested parties and stakeholders at public workshops and hearings held during
the AB 1890/SB 90 process, the Commission finds that photovoltaic, small wind
systems (not more than 10 kW), fuel cells using renewable fuel and solar-thermal
technology all meet the qualifying criteria for eligibility contained in the
Commission’s Policy Report. These eligibility criteria were applied to individual
systems representing each of the four technology categories. At least one or more
systems in each of the four technology categories was found to satisfy the
eligibility criteria. Therefore, technologies from all four categories are eligible to
receive funding from the Emerging Renewables Resources Account.
To qualify for funding, however, individual systems in the four eligible technology
categories must meet the requirements contained in this guidebook.  The
Commission recognizes that there may be individual systems employing each of the
four technologies that may not be able to meet these requirements because of the
system’s stage in its research, development and demonstration, and therefore will not
qualify for funding despite the eligibility of their underlying technology.
Those who wish to receive funding from the Emerging Renewable Resources
Account under the Buydown Program must purchase an electrical generating
system that employs an emerging renewable technology and meets certain
eligibility requirements, and follow the reservation and claim procedures outlined in
this guidebook. If after reading this guidebook, you require additional information
about the Buydown Program please contact the Commission Call Center at (800)
555-7794 or send e-mail to renewable@energy.state.ca.us.
Summary of Buydown Program
The Buydown Program is a multi-year program that provides funding in the form of
rebates (also referred to herein as “buydown payments”)  for eligible electricity
generating systems that are powered by emerging renewable resources. Funding
from the Buydown Program is intended to substantially reduce the current costs of
generating equipment using emerging renewable technologies. The intent is to
reduce the net cost to the end user of such generating systems and, thereby,
stimulate substantial sales of such systems during a period of at least four years
beginning in 1998. These increased sales of generating equipment are expected
to encourage manufacturers, sellers and installers to expand their operations and
reduce their costs.  In addition, the Buydown Program is intended to foster the
siting of small, reliable generating systems throughout California at locations
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4where the electricity produced is needed and consumed. This is known as
“distributed generation.”
Under the program, buydown payments may be made either directly to the retailer
of a generating system, to the purchaser, or to the lessor in a leasing
arrangement. It is expected that most purchasers of these systems will find it
preferable to have the buydown payment paid directly to the retailer, and thereby
deducted from the price the purchaser will pay. Purchasers of these systems can
be any class of utility customer, including residential, commercial, agricultural or
industrial customers. This program, however, is open only to customers of the
California electrical corporations contributing to this fund and to customers of local
publicly owned electric utilities pursuant to Assembly Bill 29x (AB 29x).  (See “Who
Can Receive the Buydown Payment?” below.)  The electrical load served by the
generating systems must be connected to the electrical grid of such utilities.
Additionally, the generating system must be installed on the premises of eligible
customers  and be sized so that the electricity produced is expected to primarily
offset part or all of the customer's electrical needs at these premises. All electricity
generating system components must be new and unused, and must not have
been previously placed in service in any other location or for any other application,
and major system components must be approved by the Commission.  It is
expected that systems receiving rebates from this program will remain at the
original service location during their useful life.  If a system is removed for any
reason, you must notify the Commission in writing. To help maintain minimum
standards of quality, the program also requires:
1) a minimum of a full five year warranty on the entire generating system if
installed by a licensed contractor, or a limited five year warranty if installed by
the owner;
2) installation by an appropriately licensed contractor, or the system owner, and in
compliance with appropriate electrical codes; and
3) certain key system components, or the entire generating system, certified to
meet certain established standards as described herein.
The amount of the buydown payment an eligible system will receive is dependent
on:
1) the $/watt rebate level available to pay buydowns at the time an eligible system
is purchased and a buydown is reserved;
2) the size or rated electrical output of the system in comparison to the customer’s
estimated annual electrical load or usage; and
3) the total eligible costs of the system.
Table 2 provides the rebate levels available. These rebate levels will be reviewed
on an annual basis and may be decreased if reasonable, consistent with the intent
of SB 90 that rebate levels decline over the term of the program. Sellers and
purchasers of generating systems may want certainty at the time their system is
90
5ordered of the rebate amount they are eligible to receive once their system is
installed. To provide this certainty, purchasers or retailers can reserve a rebate
amount using the Reservation Request Form (CEC-1890C-1). Submitting this form
to the Commission along with the supporting documentation (see "How Do I
Reserve a Buydown") will allow purchasers or retailers to reserve a specified
rebate amount for a period of 9 months for generating systems of 10 kW or smaller
and for 18 months for all systems larger than 10 kW. A group of reservations in
one location, such as for multiple homes in a new residential development, or for
one customer at several locations, such as for multiple retail store in one retail
chain, which totals 30 kW or greater in aggregate capacity, will receive an 18
month reservation period and may request an extended reservation period, which
may be granted at the Commission’s discretion.
When the system is installed and in service the purchaser or retailer may request
a buydown payment by submitting the Reservation Confirmation and Claim Form
(CEC 1890C-2) along with the other required documentation.  (See “How Do I
Request a Buydown Payment?” below.)  If the Reservation Confirmation and
Claim Form is complete and submitted with the required documentation, the
Commission will then issue a check for the buydown, typically within 30 days of
receiving the claim form.
Table 2
Buydown Program Parameters
BUYDOWN PROGRAM FUNDS Rebate
All systems The lesser of $4.50 /watt or 50% of total
installed costs
To be eligible for this increased rebate level, the funding must be reserved and the
system must be installed on or after February 8, 2001.7 In this context, “reserved”
means the date the Commission’s Accounting Office receives an application for
funding for a proposed system. 
The Buydown Program is open to generating systems of all sizes, subject to
certain conditions and restrictions. The program, however, is intended to favor
small generating systems, such as those typically used by residential or small
commercial and agricultural customers. Pursuant to SB 90, at least 60 percent of
the program funds must be awarded to systems of 10 kW or smaller in rated
output, and at least 15 percent of the program funds must be awarded for systems
rated at 100 kW or less. The Commission applied this awarding requirement to the
initial $54 million allocated to the program. It also applied this requirement to the
$16.2 million (September 2001) and the $13 million (September 2002) in rollover
                                           
7 Systems not meeting the date criteria but otherwise meeting all other eligibility criteria contained
in this Guidebook were eligible to receive 1) the lesser of $3/watt or 50% of total costs for 10kw or
less systems or 2) the lesser of $2.50/watt or 40% of total costs for systems larger than 10kw.
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6funds reallocated to this program from other accounts within the Renewable
Resource Trust Fund.
In September 2001, the Commission created two subcategories of medium
systems: those systems larger than 10kW but smaller than 30 kW, and those
systems that are 30 kW or larger, up to 100 kW. The rollover funds reallocated to
this program for medium systems in September 2001 were distributed 75 percent
to the 10 to 30 kW subcategory and 25 percent to the 30 to 100 kW subcategory.8
All of the funds reallocated to this program for medium systems in September
2002 were distributed to the 10 to 30 kW subcategory.6 These subcategories and
allocations are intended to ensure that systems in the 10 to 30 kW subcategory
have sufficient funds available for the remainder of 2002.   These systems do not
have the option of applying for funding under the CPUC-approved Self Generation
program, which is limited to systems 30kW and larger in size.
Pursuant to AB 29x, an additional $30 million in program funds was allocated to
systems 10 kW or smaller in size.  These funds may not be distributed to medium
or large systems. Under AB 29x, $8 million of the $30 million in new program
funding must be used to fund eligible systems 10 kW and smaller located in the
service territories of local publicly owned electric utilities.  Customers of local
publicly owned electric utilities are eligible for funding under the Buydown Program
for systems purchased and installed after December 19, 2001, provided the
systems meet the requirements specified herein.
Pursuant to Interagency Agreement No. R500-02-006 between the Commission
and the California Power Authority, an additional $1.25 million from the Attorney
General's Alternative Energy Retrofit Account (AGAERA) was provided to the
Buydown Program to fund photovoltaic electricity generating systems for eligible 
K -12 public schools.  This initial contribution from the AGAERA may be increased
up to $ 25 million under the Interagency Agreement.  To qualify for these funds
schools must satisfy special requirement discussed herein as part of the Solar
Schools Program.
For generating systems placed in service (i.e., installed and generating) that are
eligible for this program, there is a maximum payment amount of $2,500,000 
overall for any single project as defined herein.
The Energy Commission will conduct random audits of systems which have
received buydown payments to ensure that the systems were properly installed,
are properly functioning and are in accordance with the information provided in the
reservation request and buydown claim forms. The Energy Commission will also
                                           
8 Of the $2.43 million in rollover funds reallocated in September 2001 to the program for medium
systems ($16.2 million x 15 percent), $1.82 million will be distributed for systems in the 10 to 30 kW
subcategory and the $0.61 million will be distributed for systems in the 30 to 100 kW subcategory.
6 $3 million of the $13 million in rollover funds reallocated to the Emerging Renewable Resources
Account in September 2002 will be distributed for systems in the 10 to 30 kW subcategory. $10
million will go to systems 10kW and smaller in size.
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III - Incentives Offered Through This Program 
 
A. Rebates Offered 
 
The rebates offered through this program vary by system size, technology, and type of 
installation.  The rebates offered for professionally installed new systems are identified 
below in Table 1.  Lower rebates, 15 percent less, are also available for owner or self 
installed systems.  Additionally, special rebates are available for systems installed for 
“affordable housing,” and may be available at a later date for public schools.  Because 
these special rebates target specific groups or classes of customers, they are discussed 
separately in Chapter VII of this guidebook.   
 
Table 1 lists the rebate levels available by size category and technology type at the 
beginning of the ERP; these rebate levels are expected to decline over time as 
described below. 
 
 
Table 1:  Rebates Available for Emerging Renewable Systems 
 
Technology Type Size Category Rebate Offered* 
<30 kW $4.00 per Watt Photovoltaic, 
Solar Thermal Electric 
Fuel Cells using a renewable fuel** =>30 kW Future Performance Incentive 
First 7.5 kW $2.50 per Watt 
Increments above 7.5 
kW up to 30 kW 
$1.50 per Watt 
Wind 
=> 30 up to 50 kW Future Performance 
Incentive 
*  Rebates for owner installed systems are discounted by 15 percent. 
** Fuel cells that operate on non-renewable fuels and are used in combined heat and power 
applications may be eligible for rebates at a later date when funds from other sources are no longer 
available. 
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B. Other Incentives May Affect Your Rebate Amount 
 
Incentives received from sources other than the ERP that lower the cost of a generating 
system may affect the rebate amount you receive from the Energy Commission.  No 
system may be issued a reservation or receive payment from the ERP if the system is 
also participating in the California Public Utilities Commission approved Self Generation 
Incentive Program.  Fifty percent (50%) of incentives received or expected must be 
subtracted from the rebate amounts listed in Table1 if the incentives are from a utility 
incentive program, a State of California sponsored incentive program, or a federal 
government sponsored incentive program, other than tax credits.  For example, under 
no circumstance will the incentive from the ERP exceed the net purchase price of the 
system (before ERP incentives).   
 
See Chapter VII of this guidebook for information regarding rebate levels for affordable 
housing. 
 
C. Performance-Based Incentives for Photovoltaic Systems 30 kW or Greater 
 
This portion of the program will be developed at a later date. 
D. Available Funds 
 
As discussed in the Overall Program Guidebook, at least $118,125,000 in funding is 
available for the ERP.  Of this amount, $10 million is allocated to performance-based 
incentives for systems 30 kW or larger.  
E. Adjustment of Rebate Levels 
 
The rebate levels for all technology types will be reduced by 20 cents per watt every six 
months beginning July 1, 2003 (and every January 1st and July 1st thereafter). In 
addition, the rebate level for photovoltaic systems will be reduced an additional 40 cents 
per watt beginning January 1, 2004. 
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APPENDIX C
ADDITIONAL RESULTS AND COUNTERFACTUAL SIMULATIONS
C.1 Additional Count Regression Results
This section describes additional count regression results using the number of purchases every
six-months as the dependent variable in Table C.1. I find similar estimation results to the estimates
shown in Table 6.3. I find that the number of purchases are negatively correlated with the sub-
sidy rate and a 10% increase in the subsidy rate results in a reduction of 4.6% in the number of
purchases.
Poisson Neg. Binomial Poisson Neg. Binomial
Subsidy Rate -0.157 -0.366 -0.614*** -0.614***
(0.089) (0.437) (0.019) (0.070)
% Change in Installations -1.5% -0.4% -4.6% -4.6%
Constant 6.962*** 6.346** 9.350*** 9.350***
(0.456) (2.239) (0.062) (0.281)
6-month Effects N N Y Y
Year Effects Y Y N N
LL -228.142 -67.604 -44.252 -44.252
Observations 10 10 10 10
Table C.1: Models for Semi-Annual Installations
C.2 Estimation Results
In Table C.2, I present the estimates from the three specifications of the dynamic model in
a market that is reduced to 20% of the full model’s market size. The difference in the estimated
parameters across the specifications are larger relative to the full model. This shows the importance
of choosing the correct market size for the model.
In Table C.3, I present the estimates for the three specifications of the dynamic model that
includes an additional regime change. An additional regime change is included for the second six
month period in 2005. This coincides with the unscheduled change in the subsidy rate. There is a
small change in the magnitude of the estimates on the present value and net price variables from
the estimates in Table 6.6.
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Sub Belief PF Pes AR
Solar Price - State State
ln PV ($) 0.876*** 0.677*** 0.926***
(0.065) (0.068) (0.074)
Efficiency (%) 0.798*** 0.750*** 0.793***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
Eff*Small Roof 0.193*** 0.187*** 0.194***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Eff*Med Roof 0.093*** 0.089*** 0.093***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
ln Net Price ($) -1.018*** -0.795*** -1.074***
(0.0.071) (0.074) (0.081)
Price*Med Value 0.042*** 0.0415*** 0.042***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Price*High Value 0.019** 0.018** 0.019**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -10.270 -10.065 -10.121
MSA FE Y Y Y
LL -79025.87 -79044.49 -79013.56
# Of Obs 101110 101110 101110
Escalation Rate 2.2% 2.2% 2.2%
Halton Draws - 50 50
Table C.2: Second Stage Estimation Results (Reduced Sample)
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Sub Belief PF Pes AR
Solar Price - State State
ln PV ($) 1.180*** 1.117*** 1.203***
(0.048) (0.074) (0.074)
Efficiency (%) 0.659*** 0.643*** 0.659***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
Eff*Small Roof 0.163*** 0.162*** 0.164***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Eff*Med Roof 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.075***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ln Net Price ($) -1.359*** -1.288*** -1.386***
(0.052) (0.080) (0.08)
Price*Med Value 0.041*** 0.0413*** 0.0419***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Price*High Value 0.019** 0.0190*** 0.0195***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -11.346 -11.272 -11.311
MSA FE Y Y Y
LL -100041.87 -100062.95 -100033.75
# Of Obs 505558 505558 505558
Escalation Rate 2.2% 2.2% 2.2%
Halton Draws - 50 50
Table C.3: Second Stage Estimation Results with an Additional Regime Change
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C.3 Counterfactual Simulations
I present the results of counterfactual simulations for the perfect foresight case and the auto-
renewal case in the tables below. I find the results of the counterfactuals are similar across the three
specifications.
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